Verification Techniques for Hardware Security by Fern, Nicole Chan
UC Santa Barbara
UC Santa Barbara Electronic Theses and Dissertations
Title
Verification Techniques for Hardware Security
Permalink
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/2ch6f44s
Author
Fern, Nicole Chan
Publication Date
2016
 
Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation
eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library
University of California
University of California
Santa Barbara
Verification Techniques for Hardware Security
A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction
of the requirements for the degree
Doctor of Philosophy
in
Electrical and Computer Engineering
by
Nicole Chan Fern
Committee in charge:
Professor Kwang-Ting (Tim) Cheng, Chair
Professor Forrest Brewer
Professor Tim Sherwood
Dr. C¸etin Kaya Koc¸, Lecturer
Professor Huijia (Rachel) Lin
June 2016
The Dissertation of Nicole Chan Fern is approved.
Professor Forrest Brewer
Professor Tim Sherwood
Dr. C¸etin Kaya Koc¸, Lecturer
Professor Huijia (Rachel) Lin
Professor Kwang-Ting (Tim) Cheng, Committee Chair
June 2016
Verification Techniques for Hardware Security
Copyright c© 2016
by
Nicole Chan Fern
iii
Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge my advisor, Professor Kwang-Ting (Tim) Cheng for
the support and guidance he has provided over the past 5 years. Under his mentorship I
have been given the opportunity to find and define my own research question, and explore
the area of hardware security. Through this process I have matured as an independent
researcher and thinker, and for this I will be forever greatful.
I would also like to thank my collaborators Ismail San and Professor C¸etin Koc¸ for
introducing me to the world of cryptography! Peter Lisherness has provided valuable
advice about being a graduate student at UCSB in addition to facilitating an internship
opportunity at Apple. My lab-mates Amirali Ghofrani, Miguel Lastras, Fan Lin, C.K.
Hsu, Rui Wu, Chong Huang, Leilai Shao, and Yuyang Wang provide continuing company
and support.
This work was financially supported by the National Science Foundation as well as the
Semiconductor Research Corporation. I would also like to thank the Xilinx University
Program for their generous donation of several FPGA boards.
Finally, I would like to thank my family and friends. Without their support, especially
my husband, Jacob, and my parents, I would not have been able to complete this work.
iv
Curriculum Vitæ
Nicole Chan Fern
Education
2016 Ph.D. in Computer Engineering (Expected), University of Califor-
nia, Santa Barbara.
2013 M.S. in Computer Engineering, University of California, Santa Bar-
bara.
2011 B.E. in Electrical Engineering, The Cooper Union for the Advance-
ment of Science and Art
Work Experience
2013 Hardware Verification Engineer in the Silicon Engineering Group at
Apple Inc in Cupertino, California
2012 Software Security Intern in the Cisco Security and Government
Group at Cisco Systems in Knoxville, Tennessee
Publications
• N. Fern, I. San, C¸. Koc¸, and K-T. Cheng. “Hardware Trojans in Incompletely
Specified On-chip Bus Systems”, Design, Automation, Test in Europe (DATE) Con-
ference, 2016.
• N. Fern and K-T. Cheng. “Detecting Hardware Trojans in Unspecified Functional-
ity Using Mutation Testing”, International Conference on Computer Aided Design
(ICCAD), 2015.
• N. Fern, S. Kulkarni, and K-T. Cheng. “Hardware Trojans Hidden in RTL Don’t
Cares - Automated Insertion and Prevention Methodologies”, International Test
Conference (ITC), 2015.
• N. Lesperance*, S. Kulkarni, and K-T. Cheng, “Hardware Trojan Detection Us-
ing Exhaustive Testing of k-bit Subspaces”, Asia South-Pacific Design Automation
Conference (ASP-DAC), 2015.
• P. Lisherness, N. Lesperance*, and K-T. Cheng, “Mutation Analysis with Cover-
age Discounting”, Design, Automation Test in Europe (DATE), 2013.
• N. Lesperance*, P. Lisherness, and K-T. Cheng, “Coverage Discounting: Im-
proved Testbench Qualification by Combining Mutation Analysis with Functional
Coverage”, SRC TechCon, 2013.
• N. Lesperance*, M. Leece, S. Matsumoto, M. Korbel, K. Lei, and Z. Dodds,
“PixelLaser: Computing Range from Monocular Texture”, Advances in Visual Com-
puting, LNCS 6455, pp. 151-160, 2010.
v
*Published under maiden name
Activities and Academic Honors
• Received 3rd place in the 2016 Test Technology Technical Council’s E.J. McCluskey
Doctoral Thesis Competition Semi-Finals
• Awarded the ECE Department Dissertation Fellowship for Spring 2016
• Teaching Assistant at UCSB for 6 academic quarters for courses requiring a weekly
lecture (ECE154, Computer Architecture) and lab-based courses (ECE152A/B, stu-
dents created hardware designs using a combination of FPGA boards and discrete
circuit components) (2012 – 2015)
• Selected to teach a seminar on Matlab and also provide supplementary presentation
of topics in signal processing and control systems (2010 – 2011)
• Winner of the Leon Machiz Prize for excellence in electrical engineering (2011)
• Winner of the Class of 1907 Award for the best enrolled or graduating student in
calculus (2011)
• Winner of the Jesse Sherman Book Award for Outstanding Average in Electrical
Engineering (2010, 2011)
• Dean’s List at Cooper Union (8 consecutive semesters)
vi
Abstract
Verification Techniques for Hardware Security
by
Nicole Chan Fern
Verification for hardware security has become increasingly important in recent years
as our infrastructure is heavily dependent on electronic systems. Traditional verification
methods and metrics attempt to answer the question: does my design correctly perform
the intended specified functionality? The question this dissertation addresses is: does
my design perform malicious functionality in addition to the intended functionality?
Malicious functionality inserted into a chip is called a Hardware Trojan.
This work is devoted to developing both new threat models and detection methodolo-
gies for a less studied but extremely stealthy class of Trojan: Trojans which do not rely
on rare triggering conditions to stay hidden, but instead only alter the logic functions of
design signals which have unspecified behavior, meaning the Trojan never violates the
design specification.
The main contributions of this work are 1) precise definitions for dangerous unspec-
ified functionality in terms of information leakage and several methods to identify such
functionality, 2) satisfiability-based formal methods to test potentially dangerous un-
specified functionality for the existence of Trojans, and 3) numerous examples of how the
proposed Trojans can completely undermine system security if inserted in on-chip bus
systems, communication controllers, and encryption IP.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation and Problem Scope
Electronic devices and systems are now ubiquitous and influence key aspects of mod-
ern life such as freedom of speech, privacy, finance, science, and art. Concern about the
security and reliability of our electronic systems and infrastructure is at an all-time high.
Failure to protect these systems results in not only great financial hardship, but can give
rise to life-threatening situations as seen when patient medical records became inaccessi-
ble within all MedStar Health hospitals after their computer networks were attacked by
ransomware [1], and when cyber-attacks left nearly a quarter million people in Western
Ukraine without power or heat for several hours in the dead of winter [2].
Securing electronic systems is extremely difficult because an attacker only needs to
find and exploit a single weakness to perform malicious actions whereas defenders must
protect the system against an infinite set of possible vulnerabilities to ensure it is secure.
To address the attacker/defender asymmetry, security research has focused on developing
threat models which classify attacker capabilities, motivations, and goals, and creating a
taxonomy of vulnerabilities to address. For example, Ravi et al. [3] give an overview of
1
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the threats embedded systems face and the existing catalogue of mitigation techniques.
Security techniques target detection/prevention of a class of vulnerability given a
specific threat model. Identifying and disclosing (in a responsible manner) new vulner-
abilities to the security community is essential to the process of making systems more
secure. The task of enumerating and addressing all threat models and vulnerabilities is
never complete, but this dissertation contributes to this task by discovering and devel-
oping mitigation strategies for a novel class of vulnerability: the opportunity in most
hardware designs for an attacker to hide malicious behavior entirely within unspecified
functionality.
Verification and testing is a major bottleneck in hardware design, and as design
complexity increases, so does the productivity gap between design and verification [4].
It is estimated that over 70% of hardware development resources are consumed by the
verification task. To address this challenge, commercial verification tools and academic
research developed over the past several decades has focused on increasing confidence
in the correctness of specified functionality. Important design behavior is modeled then
various tools and methods are used to analyze the implementation at various stages in
the chip design process to ensure the implementation always matches the golden reference
model.
Behavior which is not modeled will not be verified by existing methods, meaning any
security vulnerabilities occurring within unspecified functionality will go unnoticed. In
modern complex hardware designs, which now contain several billion transistors, there
always exists unspecified functionality. It is simply impossible to enumerate what the
desired state of several billion transistors or logic gates should be at every cycle when
behavior depends not only on the internal state of the system, but also on external input
from the environment the device is embedded in. It is only feasible to model and verify
aspects of the design with functional importance.
2
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Because behaviors at a good fraction of signals for many operational cycles are un-
specified, an attacker can modify this functionality with impunity without de-
tection by existing verification methods. This thesis explores how an attacker can embed
malicious behavior completely within unspecified functionality whereas most related re-
search explores how to detect violations of specified behavior occurring under extremely
rare conditions, where the main challenge is identifying these conditions.
Malicious functionality inserted into a chip is called a Hardware Trojan. Hardware
Trojans are a major concern for both semiconductor design houses and the U.S. gov-
ernment due to the complexity of the chip design ecosystem [5, 6]. Economic factors
dictate that the design, manufacturing, testing, and deployment of silicon chips is spread
across many companies and countries with different and often conflicting goals and in-
terests. If a single party involved deems it advantageous to insert a Hardware Trojan,
the consequences can be catastrophic.
Goals of previously proposed Hardware Trojans range from denial of service attacks
such as forcing premature circuit aging [7] and on-chip system bus deadlock [8] to subtler
attacks which attempt to gain undetected privileged access on a system [9], leak se-
cret information through power or timing side channels [10], or weaken random number
generator output [11].
The process of transforming a document specifying how a chip should behave to
physical silicon is extremely complex, involving thousands of engineers and an entire
ecosystem of design tools and fabrication services. Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the
design life cycle, and the Trojan threats faced at each stage. Hardware Trojans are
extremely hard to defend against because they give the attacker the ability to modify
the circuit at any stage in the design lifecycle to introduce new vulnerabilities, not just
identify and exploit those already existing in the system [12, 13].
Before fabrication (pre-silicon), the design is modeled using an executable Register
3
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Figure 1.1: Threats Present in the Hardware Development Lifecycle
Transfer Level (RTL) hardware description language such as Verilog or VHDL and the
model is thoroughly analyzed and tested for errors. A modern design can contain several
hundred Verilog/VHDL modules, some of which are provided by external (potentially
untrusted) 3rd parties. Before fabrication, an RTL model must be transformed into a
physical design layout, which specifies how transistors are to be arranged on the silicon
wafer. This process is performed by a mix of extremely complex Electronic Design
Automation (EDA) tools (which are potentially untrusted) and manual effort.
This thesis focuses on detecting Hardware Trojans inserted in the Verilog/VHDL code,
which in some aspects is more challenging than the detection of Trojans inserted in the
gate-level netlist, physical design layout, or during or after fabrication. The EDA ecosys-
tem contains mature tools to ensure that once an RTL design is considered “golden”, all
subsequent transformations produce designs whose behavior matches that of the golden
model. This work increases confidence that the RTL reference model, used as a guide-
post for the rest of design development, itself is Trojan-free, which is essential to detecting
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any Trojans inserted at subsequent stages in the design lifecycle.
Many of the Trojans proposed in literature hide from the verification effort using
extremely rare triggering conditions. Examples of stealthy Trojan triggers are counters,
which wait thousands of cycles before changing circuit functionality, or pattern recog-
nizers, which wait for a “magic” value or sequence to appear on the system bus [14] or
as plaintext input in cryptographic hardware [15, 16, 17]. Trojans with these triggering
mechanisms generally deploy a payload which clearly violates system specifications (such
as causing a fault during a cryptographic computation).
Existing pre-silicon Trojan detection methods assume Trojans violate the design spec-
ification under carefully crafted rare triggering conditions, and focus on identifying the
structure of this triggering circuitry in the RTL code or gate-level netlist [18, 19, 20, 21].
The Trojans proposed in this dissertation do not rely on rare triggering conditions to
stay hidden, but instead only alter the logic functions of design signals which have un-
specified behavior, meaning the Trojan never violates the design specification.
Addressing this Trojan type requires a different approach from both existing Trojan
detection and hardware verification methods, since traditional verification and testing
excludes analysis of unspecified functionality for efficiency, and focuses primarily on con-
formance checking. Identifying unspecified functionality that either contains a Hardware
Trojan or could be exploited by an attacker in the future is difficult because by definition
unspecified functionality is not modeled or known by the design/verification team.
1.2 Proposed Solution
To address the threat of Trojans modifying unspecified design functionality, this thesis
provides 1) precise definitions for dangerous unspecified functionality in terms of informa-
tion leakage, 2) methods to test this potentially dangerous unspecified functionality for
5
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write_enable
write_data
read_enable
read_data
0
1
FIFO
...
secret_data
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Figure 1.2: Trojan-infested FIFO (Trojan Circuitry affecting unspecified functionality
to leak information shown in red)
the existence of Trojans, 3) an abstraction-level agnostic method to identify potentially
dangerous unspecified functionality without requiring any prior or specialized knowledge
about the design, and 4) numerous examples of how the proposed Trojans can completely
undermine system security if inserted in on-chip bus systems, communication controllers,
and encryption IP.
By definition, unspecified functionality should never significantly influence design
behavior. One way to quantify the influence a signal, x, has in a design is to assign x
different values during the conditions where x is unspecified, then check if any primary
output signals or registers differ. Normally it does not matter if x propagates to other
signals in the circuit when x is unspecified as long as the design functions correctly, but a
key insight emphasized throughout this dissertation is that if the value of x can propagate
to points the attacker can observe, it is possible for an attacker to insert a Trojan which
ties x to a signal originally not accessible to an attacker. This allows an attacker to learn
the value of this signal and leak important information from the circuit without
violating design specifications.
For example, consider the simple first-in first-out (FIFO) buffer shown in Figure 1.2,
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which writes the data currently at the input write data to the buffer when the signal
write enable is 1 and the FIFO is not full, and places data from the buffer on the
read data output when the signal read enable is 1 and the FIFO is not empty. What
should the value of read data be when read enable is 0 or the FIFO is empty? It may
seem logical to assume the value of read data under such conditions retains its value
from the previous valid read, but what if the FIFO has never been written to or read
from before? In this case the value is unknowable, and cannot be specified.
It is very likely the verification effort will only examine the value of read data when
read enable is 1 and the FIFO is not empty because it is assumed that any circuitry in
the fan-out of read data is only used during a valid FIFO read. However, this means
an attacker can modify the FIFO design to leak secret information on the read data
output during all cycles for which the unverified conditions hold. This malicious cir-
cuitry is shown in red in Figure 1.2. It should be emphasized that these conditions occur
quite frequently making this Trojan behavior hard to flag using existing pre-silicon de-
tection methodologies relying on the identification of behavior occurring only under rare
conditions.
Chapter 2 focuses on a special class of unspecified functionality, RTL Don’t Cares
[22]. We present a novel Trojan which leaks information by modifying only existing don’t
care bits. RTL don’t cares have long plagued chip verification due to hard-to-diagnose
“X-bugs.” In Chapter 2, we provide a formal automated X-analysis technique based on
combinational equivalence checking which both prevents the insertion of this new Trojan
type and also has the potential to uncover accidental X-bugs as well. We demonstrate
our prevention methodology on an Elliptic Curve Processor design susceptible to the
insertion of a Trojan capable of leaking all key bits by modifying only don’t cares.
Chapter 3 presents a methodology to identify dangerous unspecified functionality
beyond RTL Don’t Cares [23]. Based on mutation testing, this method is capable of
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identifying signals and conditions corresponding to dangerous unspecified functionality
in FSM, C, SystemC, TLM, RT, and gate-level models. This chapter also provides mu-
tant ranking heuristics to prioritize analysis of the most dangerous functionality. The
presented methodology integrates easily with existing verification flows and can be run
alongside Coverage Discounting [24], a technique which reflects error propagation abilities
of the testbench in functional coverage metrics. This method applied to a UART con-
troller discovered an entire class of Trojan exploiting undefined behavior in bus protocols
along with poorly tested interrupt functionality.
Chapter 4 provides general guidelines for identifying dangerous unspecified func-
tionality for an important class of design: on-chip bus systems [25]. Regardless of
the specific bus topology and protocol, bus behavior is never fully specified, meaning
there exist cycles/conditions where some bus signals are irrelevant, and ignored by the
verification effort. Chapter 4 presents a general model for creating a covert Trojan com-
munication channel between SoC components by altering existing on-chip bus signals
only when they are unspecified and demonstrates how a Trojan channel can be inserted
undetected in several widely used standard bus protocols such as AMBA AXI4 and APB.
To illustrate how a Trojan channel can give an attacker a powerful foothold in a complex
system, a Trojan channel is inserted in an SoC design running a multi-user Linux OS.
An on-chip memory (OCM) is available to all users, but access is managed by the kernel
to ensure memory isolation and privacy. The channel allows an unprivileged attacker
running software on the system to access root-user memory transactions.
Chapter 5 provides an automated procedure to detect Trojan circuitry modifying
unspecified design functionality. Building upon Chapters 3 and 4, which focus on identi-
fying possibly dangerous functionality but do not classify the functionality as containing
a Trojan or not, the analysis procedure in Chapter 5 takes as input unspecified function-
ality given as a list of (x, C) pairs. For a design specified as RTL code or a gate-level
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netlist, a signal x, which is unspecified when a condition, C, holds, our procedure deter-
mines if a Trojan is using x to leak information during C. For the FIFO in Figure 1.2, the
(x, C) pairs would be (read data, read enable == 0), and (write data, write enable
== 0). The Trojan circuitry shown in red is detected by our procedure if the signal
secret data propagates to the boundaries of the design.
For gate-level designs, the procedure formulates the Trojan detection problem in
terms of combinational equivalence checking [26], a mature formal verification technique
for which commercial tools with the ability to analyze industry-scale designs exist. For
designs written in Verilog or VHDL, the procedure traverses the control/data-flow graph
to construct formulas for the assignment of all circuit output signals and recent advances
in Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) solvers [27] provide the ability to determine if x
can affect the formula evaluation under C, thereby indicating the presence of a Trojan.
Designs analyzed include an adder coprocessor with an AXI4-Lite bus interface and a
UART communication controller with a Wishbone Bus interface.
Chapter 6 details a post-silicon Trojan detection methodology developed to ac-
tivate Trojans using rare conditions to trigger when malicious behavior occurs [28].
The goal of the proposed detection method is to overcome the weaknesses of existing
post-silicon Trojan detection strategies which bias test vectors based on controllability
and observability metrics. Our method instead uses the observation that to reduce the
area/power/timing footprint of the Trojan, an attacker is likely to only use k of n con-
trollable signals for triggering, where k << n, and we target exhaustive testing of all
k-subspaces.
Chapter 7 summarizes our contributions and gives several possible directions for
future research.
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Chapter 2
Hardware Trojans Hidden in RTL
Don’t Cares
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a novel Trojan which leaks information by modifying only
existing don’t care bits along with a formal automated X-analysis technique based on
combinational equivalence checking which both prevents the insertion of this new Trojan
type and also has the potential to uncover accidental X-bugs as well. We demonstrate
our prevention methodology on an Elliptic Curve Processor design susceptible to the
insertion of a Trojan capable of leaking all key bits by modifying only don’t cares.
2.1.1 Hardware Trojans
Many Trojan taxonomies have been proposed [12, 29, 13], which categorize Trojans
based on the design phase they are inserted, the triggering mechanism, and malicious
functionality accomplished (payload). Most existing Trojans can be divided into the
following categories:
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1. The logic functions of some design signals are altered, causing the circuit to violate
the system specification
2. The Trojan leaks information through side-channels, and no functionality of any
existing signals is modified
In this chapter, we addresses a third, less studied type of Trojan:
3. The logic functions of only those design signals which have unspecified behavior
are altered to add malicious functionality without violating system specifications
The key difference between Categories 2 and 3 is that Trojans in Category 3 alter
the design in the boolean/functional domain, whereas Trojans in Category 2 only ma-
nipulate non-boolean side channels, and require characterization of these side channels
for detection.
In this chapter, the unspecified behavior necessary to implement Trojans in Category
3 results from don’t cares specified by the designer in the RTL code. We present
techniques to both insert and prevent insertion of Category 3 Trojans in the RTL code
or gate-level netlist. An attacker can assign values or tie other internal design signals to
RTL don’t cares to accomplish malicious functionality, such as leaking secret information.
Prevention of this new Trojan type requires refining the system specification (Verilog
code) by first identifying the “dangerous” don’t cares, then disambiguating them by
selecting static values to assign.
Unlike Trojans in Category 1, which often rely on rare triggering conditions to avoid
causing incorrect design behavior during testing and normal design operation (ex. [14, 15,
16, 17]), our proposed Trojans are theoretically impossible to detect even if all possible
input sequences are tested. Moreover, the proposed Trojans are undetectable even if
a perfect sequential equivalence checker is used to check if a Trojan-infested RTL or
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gate-level implementation conforms to a golden RTL design. This is because the design
behavior being maliciously modified by the Trojan payload is itself unspecified in the
original specification! Therefore, existing pre-silicon detection methodologies targeting
identification of nearly unused circuitry, or rare node values [19, 20] do not address this
new Trojan type.
IP watermarking by embedding secret information in the assignment of don’t care
values [30] is conceptually similar to the proposed Trojan insertion methodology, as both
view RTL don’t cares as an opportunity for the insertion of extra functionality.
To the best of our knowledge, [31] is the only work which recognizes the potential to
implement malicious behavior in unspecified design functionality. [31] defines unspecified
functionality as incompletely specified state transition and output functions, given a
digital system specified as a finite-state machine (FSM). The process of logic synthesis
takes an incompletely specified FSM M and transforms M to a completely specified
gate-level FSM, M ′, which may contain additional unwanted state transitions and output
assignments while still conforming to the original FSM.
The method proposed in [31] uses state reachability as a metric for trust. First the
designer must manually categorize all design states as either protected or non-protected in
a golden symbolic FSM model (M). If a path to a protected state exists in the gate-level
implementation (M ′), but does not exist in M , M ′ is considered untrusted.
Our work differs significantly from this approach and overcomes the following limita-
tions of the state reachability based method for machines specified using symbolic FSM
models proposed in [31]: 1) analysis must be performed on a symbolic representation
of the design state space, 2) the labeling of protected v. non-protected symbolic states
must be done manually and it is likely most designers would not have a clear idea or
guidance for this labeling task, and 3) either full reachability analysis of protected states
is required, making the method unscalable to modern designs, or the T flip-flops in the
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circuit can be modified so no transitions from unprotected to protected states are allowed.
While it is common for protocols and controller modules to have reference state dia-
grams or state tables, from which a symbolic representation can be built and analyzed,
often the only available specification for a complex design before logic synthesis is de-
scribed in HDL such as the RTL code. We focus only on analyzing RTL don’t cares since
these precisely represent the freedom given to the synthesis tool for optimization and the
freedom available to the attacker for implementing malicious functionality.
The second major difference between our work and [31] is that our notion of dangerous
unspecified functionality is based on information leakage potential instead of protected
state reachability. This has the main advantage that the designer is only required to
identify attacker-observable signals, avoiding the high-effort manual categorization of
symbolic states as protected or non-protected.
2.1.2 RTL X’s and Don’t Cares
X’s appearing in RTL code have different semantics for simulation and synthesis.
In simulation, X’s represent unknown signal values, whereas in synthesis, X’s represent
don’t cares, meaning the synthesis tool is free to assign the signals either 0 or 1.
During simulation there are two possible sources of X’s: 1) X’s specified in the RTL
code (either explicitly written by the designer or implicit such as a case statement with
no default), and 2) X’s resulting from uninitialized or un-driven signals, such as flip-flops
lacking a known reset value or signals in a clock-gated block. X’s from source 1 are don’t
cares, and are assigned values during synthesis, meaning they are known after synthesis,
whereas X’s from source 2 may be unknown until the operation of the actual silicon.
The Trojans we propose take advantage of source 1 X’s, and clearly, if the design logic
is fully specified, and don’t cares never appear in the Verilog code, these Trojans cannot be
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inserted. However, don’t cares have been used for several decades to minimize logic during
synthesis [32], and forbidding their use can lead to unacceptable area/performance/power
overhead. For the case study presented in Section 2.4, replacing all X’s in the control
unit Verilog with 0’s results in almost an 8% area increase for the block.
[33] and [34] give an industry perspective and overview of the many problems caused
by RTL X’s during chip design/verification/debug along with a survey of existing tech-
niques and tools which address X-issues. Simulation discrepancies between RTL and
gate-level versions of a design due to X-optimism and X-pessimism, and propagation of
unknown values due to improper reset or power management sequences [35] are all issues
addressed by existing research and commercial tools.
Our work presents yet another issue resulting from the presence of X’s in RTL code,
and provides further incentive to allocate verification resources to these existing X-
analysis tools. However, existing tools aim to uncover accidental functional X-bugs, while
the proposed Trojans can be considered a special pathological class of X-bug specifically
crafted with malicious intent to avoid detection during functional verification.
X-analysis tools which focus only on providing RTL simulation with accurate X se-
mantics, perform X-propagation analysis only for scenarios occurring during simulation-
based verification, or formal methods which only analyze a limited number of cycles (ex.
the reset sequence) do not adequately address the proposed threat. Through the exam-
ples in the remainder of the paper we aim to highlight the aspects of this new threat that
differ most from the existing X-bugs targeted by commercial and academic tools.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 states the threat model
we are addressing, and presents two simple examples to illustrate how typical usage
of don’t cares in Verilog code can potentially lead to undesired information leakage,
Section 2.3 presents an automated methodology to analyze all don’t care bits in a Verilog
design and classify them based on their information leakage potential, Section 2.4 shows
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the application of this methodology to an Elliptic Curve Processor design with several
hundred don’t care bits, and Section 2.5 summarizes our contributions.
2.2 Defining Malicious Don’t Cares
2.2.1 Threat Model
The Trojans we are proposing are inserted at RTL or gate-level with the aim of
avoiding detection by equivalence checking against a Trojan-free RTL model. The Trojans
can be inserted by a malicious CAD tool, disgruntled employee, or any person with access
to the RTL code and the ability to modify either the RTL or the netlist.
Equivalence checking at the RT level of abstraction becomes conformance checking in
the presence of RTL don’t cares, because a single RTL specification simultaneously rep-
resents several possible valid gate-level implementations. When performing equivalence
checking between an RTL and gate-level implementation, the gate-level implementation
needs to match only one of all possible valid gate-level implementations specified by the
RTL [26]. The proposed Trojans take advantage of this by transforming the design into
a malicious, but valid implementation.
Our prevention methodology assumes the existence of a Trojan-free RTL model to
perform X-analysis on, and provides an improved Trojan-free model that can be used
detect any Category 3 Trojan through equivalence checking or simulation-based verifica-
tion methods. Although requiring the existence of a Trojan-free RTL model may seem
limiting, one should remember that before an attacker can successfully insert a Trojan
by defining RTL don’t cares there must exist a Trojan-free version of the RTL code
containing the X’s that the attacker hopes to exploit.
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2.2.2 Illustrative Examples
Example 1: To illustrate how don’t cares can be exploited to perform malicious
functionality, a contrived example is presented for illustrative purposes. The module
given in Listing 2.1 transforms a 4-bit input by either inverting, XORing with a secret
key value, or passing the data to the output unmodified. The choice between the 3
transformations is selected using a 2-bit control signal, control. When control=11,
Line 17 specifies that tmp can be assigned any value by the synthesis tool to minimize
the logic used.
Listing 2.1: simple.v
1 module s imple ( c lk , r e s e t , cont ro l , data , key , out ) ;
2 input c lk , r e s e t ;
3 input [ 1 : 0 ] c o n t r o l ;
4 input [ 3 : 0 ] data , key ;
5 output reg [ 3 : 0 ] out ;
6 reg [ 3 : 0 ] tmp ;
7 //tmp only as s i gned a meaningfu l va lue
8 // i f c on t r o l s i g n a l i s 00 , 01 or 10
9 always @ (∗ ) begin
10 case ( c o n t r o l )
11 2 ’ b00 : tmp <= data ;
12 2 ’ b01 : tmp <= data ˆ key ;
13 2 ’ b10 : tmp <= ˜ data ;
14 //Trojan l o g i c −−−−−−
15 // 2 ’ b11 : tmp <= key ;
16 //−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
17 default : tmp <= 4 ’ bxxxx ;
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18 endcase
19 end
20 always @ (posedge c l k ) begin
21 i f (˜ r e s e t ) out <= 4 ’ b0 ;
22 else out <= tmp ;
23 end
24 endmodule
An attacker can take advantage of the implementation freedom given by the RTL by
assigning key to tmp, causing the secret key value to appear at the output of this module.
The Trojan can be inserted in the RTL code by uncommenting Line 15, or at gate-level
by modifying the netlist after synthesis.
It should be emphasized that in either case, since the assignment of tmp during the
control=11 condition is unspecified, it is impossible to detect the Trojan even if the
design can be exhaustively simulated, or a perfect equivalence checker can compare the
golden and Trojan implementations. Cadence Conformal LEC [36] was used to perform 2
experiments: equivalence checking between the golden and Trojan RTL, and equivalence
checking between golden RTL and a Trojan-infested netlist. In both cases, the equivalence
checker was unable to detect the presence of the Trojan functionality.
The don’t cares assigned to tmp in Line 17 are useful to the attacker because:
1. The don’t care assignment is reachable
2. A primary output (which the attacker can observe) differs depending on the value
of the don’t care bits
Example 2: In the previous example, all the don’t care bits are dangerous and
should be disambiguated in the RTL code. The following example, similar to Example
1 with the addition of a 3-bit FSM with 5 reachable states, illustrates that not all don’t
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cares are dangerous, and that the goal of any Trojan prevention or X-analysis technique
is to identify only the dangerous X’s and allow the synthesis tool to use the remaining
don’t cares for logic minimization.
Listing 2.2: simple state.v
1 module s i m p l e s t a t e ( c lk , r e s e t , cont ro l , data , key , out ) ;
2 input c lk , r e s e t ;
3 input [ 1 : 0 ] c o n t r o l ;
4 input [ 3 : 0 ] data , key ;
5 output reg [ 3 : 0 ] out ;
6 reg [ 3 : 0 ] tmp ;
7 reg [ 2 : 0 ] counter , next counter ;
8 reg [ 3 : 0 ] pattern ;
9 //Truncated Counter 0−4
10 // 5 ,6 , and 7 never appear
11 always @(∗ ) begin
12 i f ( counter < 3 ’ h4 )
13 next counter <= counter + 3 ’ b1 ;
14 else next counter <= 3 ’ b0 ;
15 end
16 always @(posedge c l k ) begin
17 i f (˜ r e s e t ) counter <= 3 ’ b0 ;
18 else counter <= next counter ;
19 end
20 always @(∗ ) begin
21 case ( counter )
22 3 ’ d0 : pattern <= 4 ’ b1010 ;
23 3 ’ d1 : pattern <= 4 ’ b0101 ;
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24 3 ’ d2 : pattern <= 4 ’ b0011 ;
25 3 ’ d3 : pattern <= 4 ’ b1100 ;
26 3 ’ d4 : pattern <= 4 ’ b1xx1 ;
27 default : pat tern <= 4 ’ bxxxx ;
28 endcase
29 end
30 always @ (∗ ) begin
31 case ( c o n t r o l )
32 2 ’ b00 : tmp <= data ;
33 2 ’ b01 : tmp <= data ˆ key ;
34 2 ’ b10 : tmp <= ˜ data ;
35 2 ’ b11 : tmp <= data ˆ { pattern [ 3 ] , pattern [ 2 : 0 ] & counter } ;
36 endcase
37 end
38 always @ (posedge c l k ) begin
39 i f (˜ r e s e t ) out <= 4 ’ b0 ;
40 else out <= tmp ;
41 end
42 endmodule
In Listing 2.2 there are 6 total assignments of 1-bit don’t care values. One could
replace these X’s in the Verilog code with 6 1-bit signals, dc0, dc1, ..., dc5. The attacker
can then choose to assign other internal design signals (such as key bits) to the don’t
care bits or leave them for the synthesis tool to assign. Line 27 can be re-written as:
default: pattern <= {dc0, dc1, dc2, dc3};
Line 27 is unreachable (and thus pattern will never be assigned dc0 − dc3) because the
variable counter only takes on values 0-4. These X’s are safe, and cannot be used to
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leak information, therefore are best left in the RTL to aid in logic optimization. A more
interesting X-assignment occurs on Line 26, which can be re-written as:
3’d4: pattern <= {1, dc4, dc5, 1};
The assignment of {dc4, dc5} to pattern[2:1] is reachable, however, by manual inspec-
tion, one can see that the only assignment influenced by pattern (Line 35) contains a
bitwise AND between counter and pattern[2:0], which prevents dc5 from propagating
further, but not dc4! This is because when counter = 3’d4, Line 35 effectively becomes:
2’b11: tmp <= data ^ {1, dc4, 0, 0};
In this example only 1 of 6 don’t cares is dangerous and necessary to remove. In a design
with hundreds of don’t cares, it is expected that only a small subset is dangerous, which
motivates why it is valuable for an X-analysis tool to take a fine-grain approach and
distinguish between unreachable, reachable but non-propagating don’t cares, and don’t
cares that have the potential to propagate to outputs or attacker observable points.
2.2.3 Formal Definition
The following sets of signals can be defined for any design:
S: all signals
D: don’t care bits in the RTL code, where D ⊆ S
I: signals an attacker can influence, where I ⊆ S, and D ⊆ I
O: signals an attacker can observe, where O ⊆ S
The following sets are defined for each dci, dci ∈ D:
Oi: observable signals which differ when dci = 0/1, Oi ⊆ O
Pi: set of primary input sequences which cause signals in Oi to differ
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Sets O and I can be determined based on the design specification, but it is reasonable
to assume that O consists of all primary outputs and I consists of all primary inputs
and don’t care bits. Through the examples in the previous section, we have seen that a
don’t care bit, dci, is dangerous iff Pi 6= ∅. We will call an input sequence, Ti ∈ Pi, a
distinguishing input sequence for dci. Our solution for identifying dangerous don’t
cares, given in Section 2.3, determines if Pi 6= ∅. For scalability reasons, our solution
may over-approximate the set of don’t cares classified as dangerous.
If dci is classified as dangerous, dci should be specified in the Verilog code, instead
of being left as a don’t care bit. If the circuit designer cannot afford to specify all
dangerous don’t cares due to tight area and timing constraints, the following metric based
on |Pi| provides a ranking that can be used to replace the don’t cares most accessible
to an attacker. |Pi| reflects the information leakage potential of dci because if |Pi| is
large, then there exist many conditions under which the attacker can learn the value of
dci. Considering the probability of each sequence in Pi occurring during normal circuit
operation, and how many sequences the attacker can force to occur can also improve the
accuracy of this metric. An attacker can force a distinguishing input sequence Ti, if all
signals in Ti are in I.
2.3 Identification of Dangerous Don’t Cares
2.3.1 Methodology
The problem of finding if a distinguishing input sequence exists has been formulated
in [37] as a sequential equivalence checking problem. In [37], the analysis was performed
to find X-bugs, not prevent Hardware Trojans, but like the Trojans we are proposing,
X-bugs result from reachable X-assignments that affect primary outputs in the design.
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A key difference between X-bugs and the proposed Trojan type is that in many de-
signs, for example, a serial multiplier, or the Elliptic Curve Processor analyzed in Section
2.4, the values at primary outputs during intermediate cycles in the computation typi-
cally don’t matter, as long as the final computation result is correct. X’s propagating
to primary outputs during intermediate cycles generally aren’t considered X-bugs if the
final result is unaffected, however, information leakage can still occur during these inter-
mediate cycles if the attacker can observe the primary outputs of the circuit.
The equivalence check is performed between 2 near identical versions of the design:
one where dci = 0 and one where dci = 1. If the designs are identical under all possible
input sequences (Pi = ∅), dci cannot possibly be used to leak design information.
We build upon this idea further by addressing the relationship between multiple don’t
cares in the design, and we formulate the problem in terms of combinational equivalence
checking and state reachability analysis.
While combinational equivalence checking between two nearly identical designs is
efficient and scalable, state reachability analysis is not. In the Elliptic Curve Processor
case study presented in Section 2.4, we illustrate how commercial code-reachability tools
can be used in place of symbolic state reachability analysis to re-classify don’t cares
erroneously marked as dangerous after combinational equivalence checking as safe.
Consider the generic example circuit in Figure 2.1, where the sequential behavior
has been removed by making all flip-flop inputs pseudo primary outputs (PPOs) and all
flip-flop outputs pseudo primary inputs (PPIs). There are n don’t care bits in the design,
and it is clear that dci and dcj have the ability to block each other from propagating.
dch is in the fan-in cone for signal a, and can also influence the propagation of dci and
dcj, while dck is completely independent from dci, dcj, and dch.
Combinational equivalence checking can be performed between 2 versions of the orig-
inal design: Cdci=0, and Cdci=1, by constructing the miter in Figure 2.2 and checking the
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dci
dcj
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dch
...
dck
...
...
... ...
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PIs
PPIs
POs
PPOs
C
Figure 2.1: Generic Circuit with Don’t Care Bits
satisfiability of node z. If z is UNSAT, then dci is safe. Otherwise, the equivalence checker
returns a distinguishing input vector (since we are performing combinational analysis,
the distinguishing sequence is now just a single vector). Note that when analyzing dci,
all remaining n − 1 don’t care bits are made primary inputs. This ensures the distin-
guishing input vector contains information about how the remaining don’t care bits are
constrained if dci is to successfully leak information.
Since we are not considering the sequential behavior of the design, the distinguishing
input vector could require that the pseudo primary inputs be assigned a value that can
never occur, in other words an unreachable state. State reachability analysis can be
performed before analysis of all don’t care bits, and a logic formula, L, describing the set
of unreachable states can be incorporated into the miter circuit as shown in Figure 2.3
to prevent the equivalence checker from finding distinguishing input vectors containing
these states.
State reachability is a hard problem, but recent advances in model checking [38] and
techniques such as [39], which over-approximate the set of reachable states, can aid in
addressing non-trivial designs. Additionally, since don’t cares can often be traced back
to single-line assignments in the Verilog code, dead-code analysis and code reachability
tools can help easily eliminate don’t care assignments that are unreachable.
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Figure 2.2: Equivalence Checking Formulation
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Figure 2.3: Equivalence Checking Formulation Excluding Unreachable States
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For Trojan prevention, an over-approximation is ideal because it ensures that a dan-
gerous don’t care will never be classified as safe due to the elimination of a distinguishing
input vector containing a state erroneously marked as unreachable.
Our analysis uses the robust Verilog parsing capabilities of Yosys [40] to identify
don’t care bits in the design, and create and write Cdci=0, and Cdci=1 in the Berkeley
Logic Interchange Format (BLIF). The logic synthesis tool ABC [41] is then used to
perform combinational equivalence checking using the cec command. ABC is also used
to compute the set of unreachable design states (which is possible for the toy examples
in Section 2.2.2) using the ext seq dcs command.
2.3.2 Existing X-Analysis Tools
Our experiments use ABC and Yosys because of their public availability and trans-
parency, however we are aware that many commercial X-analysis tools and formal engines
exist with the capability to perform similar analysis, such as Jasper X-prop [42], Atrenta
Spyglass [43], Cadence Incisive [44], and Synopsys Magellan [45], to name only a few.
Our intention is not to argue that the existing tools are incapable of performing the
necessary analysis but that settings do not exist in these tools for analyzing don’t cares
in a security context. We illustrate our approach in the general terms of equivalence
checking and state reachability to provide a clear guide to be used by others looking to
extract the same information by taking advantage of access to existing commercial tools
with advance debug capabilities and optimized runtimes.
2.3.3 Methodology Applied to Examples 1 and 2
Our tool correctly classifies all 4 don’t care bits in Example 1 as dangerous. If
Example 2 is analyzed without state reachability analysis, our tool classifies all don’t
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cares as dangerous except for dc5, which is classified as safe due to the bitwise AND on
Line 35 which always prevents propagation. All the counterexamples for dc0−dc3, assign
counter to 101, which can never occur.
ABC is used to perform reachability analysis and describe the forbidden states as a
logic function, L, which takes as input all pseudo-primary inputs and outputs 1 if the
input combination can never occur. We then modify the miter circuit in Figure 2.2 to
form the circuit in Figure 2.3 by adding an extra AND gate, with inputs L′ and z. If the
modified network is satisfiable, then the don’t care is dangerous.
Augmenting our methodology to include state reachability information results in the
correct categorization of dc0 − dc3 as safe, leaving only dc4 classified as dangerous.
2.4 Elliptic Curve Processor
We now present a case study in which manual inspection was used to identify don’t
cares in the control unit which provide an opportunity for a Trojan to leak all key bits. We
then show how our automated prevention method classifies the don’t cares which make
this exploit possible as dangerous in addition to unearthing several previously unknown
opportunities for information leakage.
2.4.1 Background
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is a public key cryptosystem whose fundamental
operations use the mathematics of elliptic curves to perform key agreement and gener-
ate/verify digital signatures. ECC is currently used in SSH and TLS, and offers more
security/key bit than RSA [46].
Like other cryptographic algorithms, ECC operations can be accelerated if imple-
mented in hardware. Our case study examines a publicly available Elliptic Curve Pro-
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cessor (ECP) which performs the point multiplication operation optimized for an FPGA
implementation [47].
Point multiplication is the fundamental operation on which all ECC protocols are
built, and the reader should refer to [47] for more background on the mathematics behind
this operation. Point multiplication takes as input, elliptic curve parameters, an initial
point on the elliptic curve, P , and a secret k, and computes G = [k]P , which is P “added”
to itself k times using the formulas for elliptic curve point addition and doubling. ECC
is secure because it is very difficult to discover k knowing only G and P .
2.4.2 The Hardware Trojan
The Trojan inserted into the ECP allows an attacker who only is allowed to observe
primary output signals to discover the secret k. This design contains a state machine
with 38 states (shown in Figure 2.4), multiple register files, and several custom arithmetic
units used by various scheduled operations. The final point, G, is computed when State
38 is reached. Much like the Trojans given in Section 2.2, the ECP Trojan exploits don’t
cares specified in a case statement during the assignment of control signals in the state
machine logic.
Listing 2.3 shows a snippet of the control logic. The control logic output signals cwl
and cwh are fed to all functional blocks in the ECP and control routing, register access,
and the operation of the custom ALU.
The design has 3 primary outputs: sx, sy, and done. sx and sy are both 233-bit
signals that hold the x and y coordinate of the final curve point G. The done signal
indicates when sx and sy are valid. We assume that the attacker can only observe these
output signals, and cannot examine the register file, input signals, or any other internal
signals. For each state in Figure 2.4, cwl and cwh are assigned values, however, there
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Figure 2.4: ECP State Machine
are many don’t cares used to optimize the assignment logic as seen in Listing
2.3. Replacing all the X’s with 0’s results in an area increase of 8% for the control unit
after synthesis.
The assignment of don’t cares to bits in cwl and cwh do not provide opportunity for
Trojan insertion in most cases, since the don’t cares are specified based on the designer’s
knowledge of which control bits are relevant during specific states. However, in State
15, control signals for register bank 2 (write-enable and bits in both address ports) are
marked as don’t care. This can be seen by examining Line 15 in Listing 2.3 and the
register file control code in Listing 2.4.
Listing 2.3: Snippet showing X’s assigned to control signals
1 always @( s t a t e ) begin
2 case ( s t a t e )
3 6 ’ d0 : begin
4 cwl <= 10 ’ h000 ; /∗ I n i t L2R Step 1 ∗/
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5 cwh <= 23 ’ h4x8484 ;
6 end
7 6 ’ d1 : begin
8 cwl <= 10 ’ h000 ;
9 cwh <= 23 ’ h4x808D ; /∗ I n i t L2R Step 2 ∗/
10 end
11 . . .
12 6 ’ d15 : begin /∗ Inv 1 ∗/
13 cwl <= 10 ’hx0D ;
14 /∗ NOTICE cwh [ 7 : 4 ] == xxxx ∗/
15 cwh <= 23 ’ h0x04x0 ;
16 end
17 . . .
18 endcase
19 end
These don’t cares specify that a gate-level implementation can choose to write or read
data to a choice of addresses, effectively making the contents of certain registers in bank
2 unknown during State 15.
Listing 2.4: Snippet from register bank module
1 /∗ Bank 2 Address Assignments
2 cwh [ 6 : 4 ] ARE X WHEN STATE==15 ∗/
3 assign rb2 addr1 = {2 ’ b0 , cwh [ 4 : 3 ] } ;
4 assign rb2 addr2 = {2 ’ b0 , cwh [ 6 : 5 ] } ;
5
6 /∗ cwh [ 7 ] IS X WHEN STATE==15
7 Leads to primary output Sy be ing X! ∗/
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8 assign rb2 we = cwh [ 7 ] ;
9 assign rb2 d in = (cwh [ 2 2 ] == 1 ’ b1 ) ? c1
10 : ( ( cwh [ 1 5 ] == 1 ’ b0 ) ? c0 : c1 ) ;
11 . . .
One of these registers directly influences the primary output signal sy in the middle
of the point multiplication. The Trojan implemented in Listing 2.5 uses this ambiguity
to replace unknown bits in sy with key bits.
Normally, an unknown value in a circuit output during an intermediate cycle in the
computation is not considered an error, because it does not affect the final point
computed during the point multiplication. We emphasize that with the knowledge of
this new Trojan type, any X-propagation to primary outputs during any cycle must be
prevented.
Listing 2.5: Snippet showing Trojan RTL
1 assign sx = ( key != 233 ’ b1 ) ? a0 : ‘BASEPOINT X ;
2 /∗ TROJAN −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
3 When s t a t e == 15 , the s i g n a l a2 i s X due to wri te−enab l e and an
address b i t be ing s e t to X in the con t r o l l o g i c ∗/
4 assign sy = ( key != 233 ’ b1 ) ? ( ( s t a t e == 6 ’ d15 ) ? {201 ’bx , key } :
a2 ) : ‘BASEPOINT Y ;
5 /∗ ORIGINAL−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− ∗/
6 /∗ as s i gn sy = ( key != 233 ’ b1 ) ? a2 : ‘BASEPOINT Y; ∗/
2.4.3 Automated X-Analysis
The ECP design has 572 primary input bits, 467 primary output bits, and 11232
state elements, resulting in a gate count over 300000. There are 538 don’t care bits in
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the design analyzed by our tool. 282 correspond to assignments made during states 0−38
to bits in cwl and cwh, 33 correspond to the default assignments (state > 38, which
should be unreachable) of these signals (see Listing 2.3), and 233 are from a default
assignment in the quadblk module.
Combinational equivalence checking between 2 very similar designs scales well, and
each don’t care only requires a few minutes of analysis by ABC. Using only combinational
equivalence checking, the 538 don’t cares are separated into 2 groups: definitely and
possibly dangerous (307 bits), and definitely safe (231 bits).
Note that the dangerous don’t cares in Row 1 of Table 1 correspond exactly to the
don’t cares selected by our original manual analysis to implement the Trojan in Listing
2.5! Rows 2 and 3 highlight additional don’t cares which an attacker may be able utilize
to leak up to 33 bits of information during various states.
The distinction between definitely and possibly dangerous don’t cares requires state
reachability analysis, because the distinguishing input vector may contain an unreachable
state. For example, the variable nextstate is assigned don’t cares (see Row 4 of Table
2.1) only if the current state variable state is outside the 0 − 38 range, which a quick
analysis of the RTL code will reveal can never occur.
Full blown state reachability analysis does not scale well, and we were unable to
extract the exact set of unreachable states using ABC. However, we were able to deter-
mine that the lines of code containing the X-assignments in Rows 4-6 in Table 2.1 are
unreachable using Spyglass, an RTL lint tool from Atrenta [43].
Spyglass performs static analysis on RTL code in order to check that certain “design
rules” are not violated. For example, the rule NoAssignX-ML is violated if the right-
hand side of any assignment contains an X. We first checked the design against the
NoAssignX-ML rule to identify all the relevant X-assignments, confirming that the don’t
cares identified by Spyglass were consistent with the don’t cares extracted using Yosys.
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Table 2.1: Classification of Don’t Cares in Elliptic Curve Processor
Row # # Don’t
Care Bits
Signal(s) Affected
Class 1: Definitely Dangerous (35 bits)
1 2 cwh[4],cwh[7], when state==15
2 1 cwh[12], when state==2
3 32 cwl, for various states ≤ 38
Class 2: Possibly Dangerous (272 bits)
4 6 nextstate[5:0], when state > 38
5 23 cwh[22:0], when state > 38
6 10 cwh[9:0], when state > 38
7 233 d[232:0], when cwh[19:16]==1 or cwh[19:16]==15
Class 3: Definitely Safe (231 bits)
It should be noted that the NoAssignX-ML rule does not perform code reachability or
X-propagation analysis.
Next the Av dontcare01 rule, which identifies reachable X-assignments was checked,
revealing that the don’t cares in Rows 4-6 in Table 2.1 are unreachable, meaning they
can be classified as definitely safe.
The don’t cares in Row 7 originate from the quadblk module and are assigned in a
default statement. While the assignment condition is possible, the propagation of these
don’t cares is gated by an enable signal, cwh[20]. When state < 38, the assignment
condition and (cwh[20]==1) can never be satisfied simultaneously. Since Spyglass only
analyzes assignment reachability, these don’t cares remain in the possibly dangerous
category. A formal property checker could be used to prove that cwh[20]==1 && state
< 38 can never be satisfied if the overhead of removing these don’t cares is too costly.
We remove the opportunity for Trojan insertion by replacing the don’t care bits listed
in Table 2.1 with 0’s and use Synopsys Design Compiler (ver I-2013.12-SP2) to synthesize
the design and measure the area overhead of the modification. The don’t cares in Rows
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Table 2.2: Area overhead of Specifying Don’t Cares in Elliptic Curve Processor
% Area Increase
Don’t Cares Replaced w/ Static Values ecsmul quadblk
Class 1 0.04 –
Classes 1 and 2 1.80 3.87
All Don’t Care Bits 8.00 3.87
1-6 and Row 7 are from the ecsmul and quadblk modules respectively.
Table 2.2 shows how replacing only dangerous, both dangerous and possibly danger-
ous, and all don’t cares affects the area overhead of the ecsmul and quadblk modules.
Even though using only combinational equivalence checking over-approximates the num-
ber of dangerous don’t cares, being cautious and removing all don’t cares in Classes 1
and 2 is still preferable to the 8% area increase resulting from indiscriminately replacing
every don’t care bit (305 total) in ecsmul.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter we present a novel Trojan type that utilizes RTL don’t cares to
leak internal circuit node values without changing circuit functionality [22]. We then
formulate the insertion and prevention of such Trojans in terms of don’t care analysis,
and illustrate, through several examples, how the characteristics of our proposed Trojans
compare with already known X-bugs targeted by existing X-analysis tools. We present
an X-analysis methodology tailored to aid in the prevention of this new Trojan type, and
validate our technique on an Elliptic Curve Processor design with 538 don’t care bits.
Our technique classified a manageable number of don’t care bits as dangerous, leading
to a negligible area increase after replacing them with safe values.
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Identifying Dangerous Unspecified
Functionality
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a general methodology based on mutation testing to iden-
tify unspecified functionality (beyond RTL don’t cares) that is susceptible to modification
by information leakage Trojans. After applying our method to a UART controller, we
discovered an entire class of Trojan exploiting undefined behavior in bus protocols along
with poorly tested interrupt functionality, despite the presence of a sophisticated verifi-
cation infrastructure.
In Chapter 2 we introduced a class of Trojans which leak information by only mod-
ifying RTL don’t care bits, and used combinational equivalence checking techniques to
differentiate don’t cares which can be exploited by an attacker to leak information and
those which are harmless and should remain in the design for optimization during synthe-
sis. This analysis technique relies on the maturity of combinational equivalence checking
tools for RTL designs, making it hard to generalize to SystemC, C, and other high level
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modeling languages. Additionally, only unspecified functionality captured by don’t care
bits can be analyzed. This chapter builds upon the ideas presented in Chapter 2, but our
proposed mutation-based method is more general since mutation testing is applicable to
FSM, C, SystemC, TLM, RT, and gate-level models, only requiring that the model be
executable and that a testing scheme exists.
The analysis methodology presented in this chapter randomly samples possible design
modifications (known as mutations in mutation testing [48]). We filter out modifications
that are not dangerous (do not affect unspecified or poorly tested functionality) by moni-
toring functional coverage and signals observable to the attacker/user. After our analysis,
the verification team is presented with a list of design modifications ordered from most
dangerous to least dangerous which are representative of functionality which either needs
to be specified or better tested to ensure the absence of Trojans.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 summarizes existing related
work on mutation testing, Section 3.3 illustrates how a Trojan only modifying unspecified
functionality can leak design information, Section 3.4 reviews Coverage Discounting, a
technique our method builds upon, Section 3.5 introduces our methodology for detecting
dangerous unspecified functionality, Section 3.6 applies our methodology to a UART
design, and Section 3.7 summarizes our results and contributions.
3.2 Related Work
The goal of mutation testing is to gauge the effectiveness of the verification effort by
inserting artificial errors (faults) into the design code then recording how many faulty
versions of the design (mutants) are detected. Mutation analysis is motivated by the
observation that if the test bench is unable to detect artificial errors, it is likely that real
design errors are also going unnoticed.
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Mutation testing has been used for software security analysis to verify security proto-
cols, determine program susceptibility to buffer overflow attacks, and identify improper
error handling [48, 49]. In the hardware domain, mutation testing is primarily used for
test bench qualification [50]. Fault models and fault injection tools exist for SystemC
[51], TLM [52], and RTL [53].
Two well known drawbacks of mutation analysis are 1) long runtime and 2) large
manual effort required to analyze undetected mutants, some of which may be redundant.
Redundant mutants are those under all possible inputs, can never cause any change in
the design “care” outputs.
Coverage Discounting [24], further detailed in Section 3.4, is a technique which iden-
tifies undetected mutants which cause changes in functional coverage. In doing so 1)
redundant mutants are filtered out from analysis, 2) the remaining undetected mutants
are associated with specific functional coverpoints making analysis easier, and 3) the cov-
erage score is revised to reflect the error propagation and detection properties of the test
bench. Our technique builds upon Coverage Discounting by identifying mutants which
cause changes in attacker-observable signals (in addition to those which cause changes in
functional coverage) to filter out redundant mutants while highlighting mutants related
to functionality vulnerable for use in information leakage Trojans.
3.3 Information Leakage Trojans
We return to the simple FIFO example given in Figure 1.2 in Chapter 1, to motivate
how mutation testing can identify functionality susceptible to modification by information
leakage Trojans. Data is written to the FIFO when it is not full and write enable ==
1, and data is read from the FIFO when the FIFO is not empty and read enable == 1.
Data can be written to and read from the FIFO simultaneously.
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What is the correct value of read data when read enable == 0? To save energy,
it would make sense to maintain the value of read data from the last read operation,
but it is unlikely that this particular behavior is explicitly specified or tested. The red
circuitry in Figure 1.2 shows a simple Trojan which leaks information by routing a secret
internal design signal to read data whenever a read operation is not occurring. Because
the value of read data is able to propagate to the boundary of the main module, the
attacker is able to learn the value of secret data.
Listing 3.1 gives the Verilog code describing the read behavior of the FIFO in Figure
1.2. To illustrate the potential of mutation analysis to highlight the weakness in the
verification infrastructure allowing this Trojan to exist undetected, consider a fault which
changes the AND operator (highlighted in pink) to an OR operator in Line 2 of Listing
3.1. This fault causes read data to update whenever the FIFO is not empty, even if a
read operation is not occurring. If a read operation occurs, the read pointer will increment
as seen in Line 7 of Listing 3.1 and in the following cycle, even if read enable == 0,
read data will be updated with the value of the next FIFO item.
Listing 3.1: FIFO Read Behavior
1 //Memory Access Behavior
2 i f ( r ead enab l e && ! buf fer empty )
3 read data <= mem[ r ead pt r ] ;
4 . . .
5 //Pointer Update Behavior
6 i f ( r ead enab l e && ! buf fer empty )
7 r ead pt r <= read pt r + 1 ;
During testing, it is likely that a read operation will occur, but the FIFO will not
immediately become empty, meaning the spurious updating of read data can be observed
if the waveforms of the fault-free and faulty design are compared. However, it is unlikely
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that this fault will cause any tests to fail since the fault does not cause the read pointer
to spuriously update, and when read enable == 0, the test bench has no incentive to
check the value of read data. Notice that the functionality affected by this fault is useful
for an attacker because:
1. Observable signals at the boundary of the main module deviate from the fault-free
version during testing (indicating that information can be leaked during normal
operation without requiring the attacker to force the design into a rare state)
2. The fault is undetected
The methodology presented in Section 3.5 would flag this fault for analysis, forcing
the verification team to define behavior for the read data signal when read enable ==
0 then write a test case or checker for this behavior in order to detect the fault, resulting
in an improved test bench able to detect the Trojan in Figure 1.2.
3.4 Coverage Discounting
Before detailing our method for identifying dangerous unspecified functionality, we
review Coverage Discounting, the technique our methodology is based upon.
3.4.1 Motivation and Procedure
The goal of verification metrics are to 1) identify if test vectors adequately stimulate
the design, and 2) determine if the test bench is capable of detecting errors. Coverage
metrics, such as code, toggle, and functional coverage are widely employed and reflect
how well the design is activated by test bench, but do not qualify the error propagation
abilities of the verification infrastructure. Mutation testing, on the other hand, meets
both goals, but is time-consuming and the results are difficult to analyze.
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Figure 3.1: Coverage Discounting Flow
Coverage Discounting incorporates the information mutation testing provides about
the error propagation abilities of the test bench into the coverage score meaning after
Coverage Discounting, the verification team can target improvement of the coverage score
as is typical in the verification flow instead of analyzing artificial faults.
To accomplish this, the decision procedure shown in Figure 3.1 is used to determine
if the coverage score needs to be revised downward (the red path shows the conditions
necessary for decreasing the coverage score). Before fault injection, coverage is recorded
for the fault-free design during all tests. Then for each fault injected in the design:
1. Run all tests on the faulty design and record coverage
2. If all of the tests pass (the fault goes undetected) examine the coverage score: if
coverage changed under the undetected fault, subtract the differing coverage
from the original coverage score
To regain the discounted coverage, a verification engineer must write more tests or
improve the checkers. Coverage discounting relies on the observation that if a test bench
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cannot even detect the difference between a design which covers certain functionality
and a design which does not, the test bench is incapable of detecting potential errors
associated with that functionality.
3.4.2 Example
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Figure 3.2: Discounting Example: A Bus Interface Controller (a mutant disabling
burst mode is not detected, in turn causing the burst mode coverpoint to be dis-
counted)
Suppose we are validating the bus interface controller shown in Figure 3.2a. Listing
3.2 details the portion of the controller which enables burst transactions and defines a
coverpoint, BURST MODE, which is considered covered when burst == true.
40
Identifying Dangerous Unspecified Functionality Chapter 3
Listing 3.2: Original Design
1 i f ( t r a n s a c t i o n l e n >= 5)
2 burst := true ; t r a n s a c t i o n l e n := t r a n s a c t i o n l e n − 4 ;
3 else
4 burst := f a l s e ; t r a n s a c t i o n l e n := t r a n s a c t i o n l e n − 1 ;
5 . . .
6 BURST MODE : coverpo int burst ;
Note that this controller has a bug which is undetected: the number of packets sent
in burst mode is assumed to be 5 in the condition (Line 1 in Listing 3.2) and 4 during
the transaction length calculation (Line 2 in Listing 3.2). This causes 4 packets, followed
by 1 packet to be sent instead of 5 together.
The test bench shown in Figure 3.2a sends a transaction through the controller and
captures the output on the far side of the bus. The checker (a collection of assertions,
error checks, and other test bench components that together output a binary pass/fail
verdict for each test) ensures that the received data matches the sent data. If so, the
test will pass, and as long as a transaction with length ≥ 4 is sent by the test bench, the
burst mode will be enabled and considered covered. However, consider the following
mutant, where an error has been inserted into the controller’s logic:
Listing 3.3: Mutated Design
1 i f ( false )
2 burst := true ; t r a n s a c t i o n l e n := t r a n s a c t i o n l e n − 4 ;
3 else
4 burst := f a l s e ; t r a n s a c t i o n l e n := t r a n s a c t i o n l e n − 1 ;
The overall effect of this mutation is illustrated in Fig. 3.2b. The output seen on the
far side of the bus is identical in both the original and mutated design – it merely arrives
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later due to being broken up into smaller pieces – so this mutation is undetected by the
checker. Since the checker cannot distinguish between normal and burst mode operation,
clearly the burst functionality has not been meaningfully covered.
Using only mutation analysis, it is easy for a validation engineer to locate mutated
source code and analyze its local behavior, but it can be difficult to use this information
to determine a mutation’s effect on design functionality and uncover test or checker
deficiencies. Coverage discounting, in this example, explicitly links the transaction len
>= 4 ⇒ false mutation with the burst mode coverpoint because
1. The burst mode coverpoint is no longer covered in the mutated design
2. The mutation is undetected by the test bench
By providing a more accurate coverage score and explaining the meaning of the mu-
tation in terms of design function, it is more likely that the real bug in this controller
will be exposed.
3.5 Identification Methodology
3.5.1 Threat Model
Our method assumes the attacker can modify the design at the RT abstraction level
or higher. This is because Trojans inserted in the gate-level netlist or later design stages
(meaning there is a golden RTL model available) can be detected using commercial
equivalence checking tools which exist as part of the standard chip design flow once the
X-analysis method proposed in Chapter 2 is applied to ensure any X’s in the golden RTL
model cannot be used to implement Trojans.
Similar to Chapter 2, we assume the goal of the Trojans our method targets is to
leak information to signals at the boundary of the IP core being analyzed or to internal
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registers/signals the attacker can observe. Since we identify scenarios where the test
bench is unable to detect changes in attacker-observable or IP boundary signals, Trojans
performing other functions affecting unspecified behavior besides information leakage are
also targeted by our method.
Our methodology can be performed at any level of abstraction, but since identify-
ing unspecified design behavior is central to Trojan prevention, performing analysis at
abstraction levels describing the design behaviorally as oppose to structurally makes in-
terpreting the results of mutation testing easier. Moreover, simulation speed improves
when more detail is abstracted away from the design, and any improvements in the design
specification or functional tests resulting from our technique carry over to all subsequent
refined versions of the design relying on the same verification infrastructure.
To clarify, our technique does not directly mark specific lines of code, wires, or gates
as being part of a Trojan, in the same way that mutation analysis does not directly find
bugs. Rather, our analysis technique highlights design functionality that is susceptible to
Trojan insertion and calls for refinement of the specification or more thorough testing of
the at risk functionality. If a Trojan already exists in this functionality, then it is likely
that the test bench improvements will detect the Trojan, and if there is no Trojan, the
improvement effort increases the chances that Trojans inserted in this functionality later
on in the design life cycle will be detected.
3.5.2 Mutant Selection
Given the wide variety of mutation models available [48] what is the criteria for
selecting the best model for Trojan detection, and can mutation analysis aid in detection
of other Trojan types? An underlying assumption of mutation analysis is the Coupling
Effect Hypothesis [48]: “Complex faults are coupled to simple faults in such a way that
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a test data set that detects all simple faults in a program will detect a high percentage of
the complex faults.” The example in Section 3.3 illustrates this concept because the more
complex fault (the Trojan in Figure 1.2) can be detected if the simpler fault (highlighted
in Listing 3.1) is detected.
If our method targeted Trojans with rare triggering conditions, this hypothesis would
not hold, since these Trojans are examples of pathological faults. However, since infor-
mation leakage Trojans are most effective when they affect a large number of observable
signals during a large number of cycles, the uniform structural sampling that simple mu-
tation models provide (such as those used by Certitude [53]) should be effective enough
to highlight the most vulnerable unspecified functionality if enough faults are injected.
A more thorough analysis of the effect different mutation models have on the success of
our technique is a topic for future research.
3.5.3 Mutant Injection and Analysis
In a security context, for a fault to be dangerous, it must be 1) undetected by the
test suite and 2) cause changes in attacker-observable signals. Figure 3.3 shows how un-
detected faults can be classified based on their influence over attacker-observable signals
and functional coverage. Dangerous faults fall into Regions A and B.2 in Figure 3.3.
Identifying Attacker-Observable Signals: The labeling of attacker-observable
signals depends on the design and attack model. For example, if an attacker can run a
malicious user-level software program which interfaces with the hardware Trojan, certain
registers will be marked as attacker-observable in addition to network interfaces. If the
design being analyzed is a peripheral or co-processor, and it is assumed the main proces-
sor may contain a Trojan, the bus interfaces between modules are considered attacker-
observable. If the attacker has physical access to the device, then all chip output pads
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are attacker-observable.
A key point to note is that even if the correct values of some attacker-observable
signals are unknown to the verification team, our technique only requires discovering
differences in the simulation trace between the faulty and fault-free designs.
What about undetected faults affecting specified functionality (Regions B.1 and B.2 in
Figure 3.3)? The faults in Region B.1 do not affect attacker-observable signals but should
be examined because they indicate design functionality is not adequately tested! The
faults in Region B.1 cause the coverage score to be revised downward during Coverage
Discounting [24], which is detailed in Section 3.4. Discounting separates faults affecting
design functionality from redundant faults by recording changes in functional coverage
caused by each fault. Discounting can be applied to any design where it is possible to
define and record functional coverage.
We are able to add our analysis to the existing Coverage Discounting flow with only
the additional overhead of tracking attacker-observable signals. The following flow both
identifies test bench weakness affecting specified functionality and highlights dangerous
unspecified functionality:
1. Record values of attacker-observable signals and functional coverage in the original
design during all tests
2. Analyze the design and generate a set of faults, then inject each fault and re-run
all tests, recording the same information as in Step 1
3. Only examine undetected faults (ones which do not cause any tests/assertions
to fail)
The following details the actions that should be taken for every undetected fault,
based on the region in Figure 3.3 the fault belongs to:
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Figure 3.3: Scenarios for Undetected Faults
• Region A: Functional coverage did not change under the fault, but a change
in some attacker-observable signals occurred. It is likely that the fault affects
unspecified design functionality susceptible to the insertion of information leakage
Trojans. Behavior for the functionality affected by the fault must be specified, and
then the test bench must be improved to check this newly defined behavior.
• Region B (Regions B.1 and B.2): Functional coverage changes under the fault
meaning specified design functionality has been modified and this modification
has gone unnoticed by the test bench. This indicates a weakness in the test bench,
and the verification engineer must examine why this change in functionality went
undetected and fix the test bench.
• Region C: Neither functional coverage nor attacker-observable signals change
meaning the fault is likely redundant (for example changing the loop condition
in for(x=0;x<10;x++) to for(x=0;x!=10;x++)), and is not worth examining.
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3.5.4 Ranking Undetected Faults
Although less than the total number of undetected faults, the number of undetected
faults in Region A of Figure 3.3 can still be too costly to completely analyze.
It is desirable that the undetected faults highlighting unspecified functionality most
advantageous for an attacker to exploit be analyzed first. Since mutation analysis is an
iterative process, after improving the test bench so that it is capable of detecting the
most dangerous faults, it is likely that many other previously undetected faults will now
be detected and not require analysis.
If there are not enough resources to dedicate to ensuring that all undetected faults
are eventually detected, the proposed ranking metrics provide confidence that precious
man-hours are spent analyzing only the most severe threats.
The following metrics are easily observed during the injection of each fault:
1. Number of attacker-observable bits differing
2. Total time attacker-observable signals differ
3. Number of distinct tests producing differences in
attacker-observable signals
Metric 1 captures whether the fault affects a few specific signals or broadly impacts
the set of attacker-observable signals. For example, if a design has 10 attacker-observable
signals, and Fault A causes 8 to differ at some point during testing, while Fault B only
causes 3 to differ, a Trojan related to the functionality of Fault A can potentially leak
more bits of information during a given cycle.
However, the number of cycles a given signal differs is also proportional to the infor-
mation leakage potential of a Trojan based on a particular fault. Metric 2 is the sum over
all tests and all attacker-observable signals of the total time each signal differs. If the 8
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signals differing under Fault A only differ for 2 cycles each, while the 3 signals differing
under Fault B differ for 10 cycles during testing, a Trojan formed from Fault B may be
more useful to an attacker.
Metric 3 gauges how likely information leakage will occur under normal usage sce-
narios. Presumably, the verification tests at the very least exercise typical design func-
tionality. If the attacker cannot force the design into states activating the mutated
functionality, faults that lead to observable differences across many tests are more useful
for developing Trojans which provide information leakage capabilities during more design
states.
3.5.5 Method Overhead and Coverage
One well known disadvantage of mutation testing is the long runtime required to apply
the entire test suite to each faulty version of the design. While our methodology also
requires simulation of all tests for each mutant, the additional overhead needed to record
attacker-observable signals and coverage, then compute differences with the fault-free
design, is negligible in comparison.
Another disadvantage of mutation testing is the amount of manual effort required
to analyze each undetected fault. The fault ranking mechanism presented in Section
3.5.4 somewhat alleviates this problem by allowing the verification engineer to review
the functionality with the largest risk of hiding an information leakage Trojan to be
analyzed first. Once the most dangerous fault is detectable by the test bench, all other
dangerous faults can be re-evaluated, and those which are now detected due to test bench
improvements no longer need to be analyzed.
The simplest and most effective method of decreasing the runtime of mutation analysis
is to simulate fewer faults. A method identifying the minimal fault set required to expose
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all verification holes for a design unfortunately does not exist. Developing metrics to
determine when a sufficient number of mutants have been simulated is one of the hardest
problems to address in mutation testing. Future research will investigate how the metrics
in Section 3.5.4 and additional simulation data can be used to develop these metrics.
3.6 UART Controller Case Study
We analyze a UART (universal asynchronous receiver/transmitter) design from Open-
Cores [54] using the methodology presented in Section 3.5. After analysis of just 4 of
the most dangerous undetected faults returned by our method, we identify unspecified
bus functionality and poorly tested interrupt functionality vulnerable to the insertion of
information leakage Trojans. After further defining portions of the bus specification and
correcting an error in the interrupt checker, the test infrastructure is able to detect these
faults as well as an example Trojan inserted in the UART bus functionality. We now
provide the case study details.
The test bench used in this case study is a propriety OVM-based suite provided by an
EDA tool vendor consisting of 80 directed tests with contained random stimuli, functional
checkers, and 846 functional cover points. This test bench is representative of a typical
mature regression suite.
There are 38 attacker-observable bits. 32 bits belong to the wb dat o signal, which
is the data bus the UART places values onto when the bus master (often a processor
core) issues read requests. The signals wb ack o, int o, and baud o, are single bit signals
which acknowledge bus transactions, signal interrupts, and define the baud rate respec-
tively. These 35 signals comprise the interface to the processor core, while the remaining
3 attacker-observable signals are the off-chip serial output, request to send, and data
terminal ready signals. For this experiment, we make the assumption that the attacker
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Table 3.1: Categorization of Undetected Faults
110 Undetected Faults
Region A Region B Region C
30 faults 2 faults 78 faults
is able to see all 38 signals.
Mutation analysis is performed using the commercial mutation analysis tool Certi-
tude [53]. Certitude faults are simple modifications made to the design source code, for
example replacing an AND operator with an OR operator, or tying a module port to a
static 0 or 1.
Fault Classification: 1183 faults are injected one by one in the design, and tests
are run until the fault is detected. Out of the 1183 faults, 110 are not detected by any
of the 80 tests. The classification of these faults into Regions A, B, and C in Figure 3.3
is presented in Table 3.1. Using our methodology, the number of faults requiring manual
analysis (those in Regions A and B) is reduced from 110 to 32.
3.6.1 Wishbone Bus Trojan
The 3 ranking metrics presented in Section 3.5.4 are equally weighted to identify the
most dangerous faults. The 3 most dangerous faults (1411, 1412, and 1413) all affect the
following line, which assigns the output enable control bit to 1 in the Wishbone Bus [55]
interface if all 4 conditions are true:
Listing 3.4: Assignment of Output Enable
assign oe = ˜ wb we is & wb stb i & wb cyc i & wbstate==2’b01 ;
Each of the 3 faults changes 1 of the bitwise AND operators (highlighted in pink) to
a bitwise OR operator. For example, fault 1411 changes the assignment to:
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Listing 3.5: Fault 1411
assign oe = ˜ wb we is & wb stb i & wb cyc i | wbstate==2’b01 ;
effectively setting oe whenever wbstate==2’b01, even if another condition is false, which
in the original fault-free design, would have prevented oe from being set.
When oe is set, the 8-bit data bus lines (coming from the UART register file) are
re-sampled, and placed in the correct byte lane on the 32-bit data output bus (wb dat o)
as seen in the following code:
Listing 3.6: Assignment of Data Output Bus
1 i f ( oe )
2 case ( w b s e l i s )
3 4 ’ b0001 : wb dat o <= {24 ’ b0 , wb dat8 o } ;
4 4 ’ b0010 : wb dat o <= {16 ’ b0 , wb dat8 o , 8 ’ b0 } ;
5 . . .
If oe is not set, the data bus retains its previous value.
Why Are Faults Modifying oe Undetected? To understand why spurious
changes on the data output bus are not detected by the test bench, which includes a
Wishbone bus protocol checker, we must elaborate on the functionality of the protocol
control signals involved in the assignment of oe (Listing 3.4): wb stb i (STB I in the
bus specification document), wb we is (WE I), and wb cyc i (CYC I).
From the specification, STB I, set by the bus master, selects a particular slave, and “a
SLAVE shall respond to other WISHBONE signals only when this [STB I] is asserted...”,
“the cycle input [CYC I], when asserted, indicates that a valid bus cycle is in progress”,
and “the write enable input [WE I] indicates whether the current local bus cycle is a
READ or WRITE cycle” [55].
In the original design, oe is only set during a valid read transaction. Under the
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3 faults, oe is incorrectly set during write transactions, when the UART slave is not
selected, and when a valid bus cycle isn’t in progress. However, during these cycles the
bus master never captures data from wb dat o, so the extra data bus changes never cause
incorrect data to be read from or written to the UART registers.
Example Output Enable Bus Trojan: This analysis indicates the UART design
may be infested with a Trojan that can leak information with impunity on the data bus
as long as all the conditions in Listing 3.4 are not simultaneously met and the test bench
would be none the wiser! Specifically, the Trojan can take advantage of the fact that the
value of wb dat o is unspecified during a write transaction or invalid cycle.
We implement this bus Trojan by changing the assignment of oe to match Listing 3.5.
We then choose to leak the value 0xdeadbeef over the bus only during write transactions
and invalid cycles by modifying the code in Listing 3.6 to the following code, shown in
Listing 3.7 (the Trojan is Lines 2-3):
Listing 3.7: Output Data Bus Trojan
1 i f ( oe ) begin
2 i f ( wb we i | ˜ wb s tb i | ˜ wb cyc i )
3 wb dat o <= 32 ’ hdeadbeef ;
4 else
5 case ( w b s e l i s )
6 4 ’ b0001 : wb dat o <= {24 ’ b0 , wb dat8 o } ;
7 4 ’ b0010 : wb dat o <= {16 ’ b0 , wb dat8 o , 8 ’ b0 } ;
8 . . .
Figure 3.4 illustrates the ability of the Trojan to leak 32 bits of data during every
write transaction while not interfering with read transactions. For example, at 135ns,
the UART responds to a read request with the correct data, not 0xdeadbeef. Simply
placing 0xdeadbeef on the data bus is good for illustrative purposes, but may not be
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Figure 3.4: Output Enable Trojan Waveform for Bus Protocol Test
useful to an attacker. One should note that Line 3 in Listing 3.7 can be changed to assign
any 32-bit value to wb dat o, including other secret internal design signals!
This Trojan is fundamentally different from Trojans relying on rare triggering con-
ditions for stealth as it is active during every write transaction, which is certainly not a
rare design state, as evidenced by Figure 3.4. It is very unlikely that this Trojan would
be detected by existing methods targeting the identification of rarely used logic.
Improving the Bus Checker: To detect faults 1411, 1412, and 1413, the following
additional check is added to the existing bus protocol checker: wb dat o can not change
unless the design has been reset, or a read request is being acknowledged. In addition to
detecting the 3 faults, the Output Enable Bus Trojan is also detected.
In a traditional verification setting, it would be unnecessary and cumbersome to add
this additional check, and the 3 faults would be considered a waste of time to analyze
because they do not affect the correctness of normal read/write operations. Our work
is the first to highlight the relationship between undetected faults affecting attacker-
observable signals and hardware Trojans, providing motivation to analyze and improve
the test bench to detect these seemingly meaningless artificial errors.
Through mutation analysis, which is a random sampling of very specific design modi-
fications, we have actually found a more general class of Trojan, the bus protocol Trojan.
The bus protocol Trojan takes advantage of unspecified functionality such as data bus
values when no valid transactions are taking place, and the value of the data output bus
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during a WRITE cycle. The FIFO Trojan in Section 3.3 actually belongs to this class of
Trojan.
3.6.2 Interrupt Output Signal
After improving the test bench to detect the 3 faults related to the Wishbone bus,
the ranking metrics presented in Section 3.5.4 identify Fault 918, which affects the inter-
rupt mechanism, as the most dangerous fault. This fault affects specified functionality,
and belongs to Region B.2 in Figure 3.3. Interestingly, this fault is not highlighted by
Coverage Discounting, but is by our technique.
The UART uses a single bit signal, int o, to notify the host processor of pending
interrupts. There are 5 different events which can cause an interrupt, and the Interrupt
Identification Register (IIR) indicates the highest priority interrupt currently pending.
A commonly used interrupt is the received data available (RDA) interrupt, which fires
when a threshold number of characters is received.
Fault 918 causes int o to become unknown for many cycles during 49 of the 80
tests. More specifically, Fault 918 causes the RDA interrupt pending signal rda int pnd
to become X instead of 1 under certain conditions, making it possible to selectively
suppress the RDA interrupt (and consequently int o) without the test bench noticing.
Although the test bench checks if IIR bits are set correctly when conditions for each
interrupt type are met, and most of the time checks that int o reflects the IIR interrupt
pending bit within 10 clock cycles, the behavior of int o is not checked if int o becomes
X. Moreover, even if a Trojan set int o to a non-X value in order to leak information,
as long as int o becomes both 0 and 1 within 10 clock cycles, the interrupt checkers
would not notice that int o is changing spuriously with respect to the IIR interrupt
pending bit. This oversight in the test bench is an example of poorly tested specified
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functionality, since the value of int o is clearly being checked in the interrupt checker,
but not thoroughly enough.
It is interesting to note that Fault 918 did not cause a change in functional coverage,
perhaps suggesting that the coverage model is not detailed enough to highlight mean-
ingful verification holes in the interrupt functionality illustrating the potential of our
analysis technique to highlight and qualify the verification of important design function-
ality outside of the coverage model.
3.7 Summary
In this chapter we propose an automated methodology to identify unspecified func-
tionality vulnerable to modification by information leakage Trojans [23]. Our method is
applicable to a wide range of abstraction levels, and also works to identify poorly tested
specified functionality in addition to dangerous unspecified functionality. We demon-
strate the effectiveness of our approach by finding an entire class of information leakage
Trojans related to unspecified bus functionality after analyzing the 3 most dangerous
faults highlighted by our method in a UART controller design. Our method also led to
the discovery of poorly tested interrupt functionality vulnerable to Trojan insertion. We
then close the verification loop by improving the design checkers to detect these faults and
show that this improvement leads to the detection of an actual Wishbone bus Trojan.
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Trojan Channels in Partially
Specified SoC Bus Functionality
4.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on Trojans in SoC on-chip buses. In Chapter 3 we presented
a general method to identify dangerous unspecified functionality in any in any type of
design, including bus systems. Mutant simulation and analysis is expensive, but necessary
if one cannot identify dangerous unspecified functionality directly by inspection. Since
bus systems are characterized by well-defined protocols and set of common topologies,
this chapter directly presents a general model for dangerous unspecified bus functionality.
Our work takes inspiration from the Wishbone bus Trojan presented in Chapter 3, and
generalizes the Trojan to other bus protocols and more complex bus topologies.
The ability to manipulate the bus system is extremely valuable to an attacker since
the bus controls communication between critical system components. A denial of service
Trojan halting all bus traffic can render an entire SoC useless. Any information trans-
ferred to/from main memory, the keyboard, system display, network controller, etc. can
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Figure 4.1: AXI Bus Protocol VALID/READY Handshake [56]
be passively captured or actively modified by Trojans inserted in the interconnect.
There exist many different bus protocols designed to optimize different design pa-
rameters such as area/timing overhead, power consumption, and performance [57]. Re-
gardless, all protocols employ signals to mark when valid bus transactions occur and
handshakes to provide rate-limiting capabilities, meaning valid and idle bus cycles can
be clearly differentiated. While bus protocols clearly define the desired values for each
data or control signal during valid transactions, the values of these signals during idle
cycles are unspecified and largely ignored by bus protocol checkers, formal verification
properties, and scrutiny during simulation-based verification. Trojan behavior during
these cycles will not be detected by traditional verification methodologies. For example,
Figure 4.1 shows the VALID/READY handshake used by each channel in the widely
used AXI4 protocol. When VALID is LOW, the information lines can take on any value,
including Trojan information.
The Trojans we propose in this work operate entirely within idle bus cycles, with the
goal being to provide a covert communication channel built upon existing bus infrastruc-
ture. This Trojan channel can be used to connect Trojan components spread across the
SoC in addition to enabling information leakage from legitimate components not possible
in the original design. Unlike previously proposed bus Trojans, which lock the system
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bus, modify bus data, and allow unauthorized bus transactions [8, 58], our Trojans never
hinder normal bus functionality or affect valid bus transactions.
In Section 4.2 we review the current solutions addressing bus architecture security
issues, and motivate why these are not adequate for detecting bus Trojans hiding in
partially specified bus functionality. Section 4.3 outlines the threat model and introduces
the Trojan channel model and circuitry, and Section 4.4 provides complete details for
AMBA AXI4 and APB. The overhead of creating a 2-way information leakage channel
between slaves with varying channel parameters in an AXI4-Lite interconnect is explored
in Section 4.5, then in Section 4.6 a Trojan channel is inserted in a full SoC system
running multi-user Linux to demonstrate how a malicious unprivileged software program
can access root-user data. Several detection methodologies are outlined in Section 4.8,
and Section 4.9 summarizes the results and contributions of this chapter.
4.2 Related Work
4.2.1 Bus Security
The following are bus security issues being addressed in literature and industry:
1. Malicious snooping of bus data
2. Enforcing bus slave access control policies
3. Deadlock prevention (malicious and accidental)
4. Data integrity, data tampering prevention
Previously proposed bus Trojans include denial of service attacks accomplished by
indefinitely asserting the LOCK signal in one of the bus masters or the WAIT signal in
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a bus slave, observing bus transactions between other components, corrupting bus data,
and allowing a master to access forbidden address ranges [8, 58].
In [58], the authors present a secure AHB bus architecture to detect the above men-
tioned Trojans at runtime. A watchdog timer is added to detect bus deadlock, and to
prevent snooping multiplexors are added on all data lines to zero the lines visible to
components uninvolved in the current transaction, however this additional circuitry was
shown to have significant impact on the maximum bus operation frequency.
Encryption of bus data [14, 59] has been proposed as a method to prevent bus
snooping. Key maintenance, along with the overhead of encryption circuitry limits the
widespread adoption of this countermeasure. While encryption of bus data prevents
snooping, it does not prevent the existence of a Trojan communication channel.
To prevent illegal peripheral access, [58] adds registers holding the allowable access
ranges for each bus master ensuring unauthorized requests are blocked and recorded.
ARM TrustZone Controllers are commercial IP blocks which provide access control mech-
anisms to memory regions and bus peripherals and are compatible with other ARM bus
IP and AMBA protocols [60].
Both these measures monitor valid bus transactions for violations. Since our proposed
Trojans never modify existing or create new valid bus transactions, these countermea-
sures will not detect communication on the Trojan channel. Moreover, neither of these
countermeasures address rouge communication between 2 slaves.
Extensive research on formal verification of bus protocols has been performed to en-
sure deadlock avoidance and fairness [61, 62, 63]. The properties checked using formal
methods can be re-used during protocol compliance checking of specific bus implemen-
tations using either formal or simulation based methods. The availability of commercial
compliance checking verification IP (ex. [64] for AMBA protocols) and pre-packaged
SystemVerilog assertions suites [65] illustrate the importance of verifying the correctness
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of specified bus functionality.
During idle bus cycles, when VALID signals are de-asserted, there are no proper-
ties/assertions to capture what the correct behavior is, because it is not relevant to the
protocol. Our proposed Trojans exploit this fact, and operate exclusively during these
cycles to avoid violating assertions or detection during property checking.
4.2.2 Hardware Trojan Detection
Many Trojans proposed in literature hide from the verification effort by only per-
forming malicious functionality under extremely rare triggering conditions. Detection
methods targeting this Trojan type identify “almost unused” logic, where rareness is
quantified by an occurrence probability threshold. This probability is either computed
statically using approximate boolean function analysis [18, 19] or based on simulation
traces [20, 21].
The Trojans we propose in this work only modify signals under conditions during
which they are unspecified, and to be detected by the existing methods, the occurrence
of such conditions must be sufficiently rare. We argue that this is seldom the case. For
example, our proposed Trojan communication channel can be used to snoop data destined
for Slave A by placing data from valid writes to Slave A into a FIFO from which the data
is read and leaked to Slave B’s bus interface whenever the channel is idle. The FIFO
write condition is a valid data transfer to Slave A, and the leakage condition causing
the data to appear at Slave B’s bus interface is an idle channel, neither of which are
inherently “rare” conditions.
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4.3 Trojan Communication Channel
There are many bus standards, providing the ability to optimize with respect to area/-
timing overhead, power consumption, and performance parameters. Common among all
standards are control signals marking when valid bus transactions occur. During idle
cycles, the value of many control and data signals are unspecified, allowing a powerful
Trojan communication channel to be built using the existing bus infrastructure. This
section first gives our threat model, then details how to insert such a channel for any bus
topology and protocol.
4.3.1 Threat Model
Since a covert communication channel is useless without a sender and receiver of
information, we assume that at least one component connected to the system bus contains
a Trojan utilizing the information received on the channel, and that there is another
Trojan to either leak data from the component it resides in or snoop bus data otherwise
not visible to the receiver and send it over the channel.
Although it is possible for the Trojan to create new bus transactions adhering to the
bus protocol during unused cycles, verification infrastructure often includes bus checkers
which count and log all valid bus transactions. For this reason, our proposed Trojans
do not suppress, alter, or create valid bus transactions, but instead re-use existing bus
protocol signals to define a new “Trojan” bus protocol allowing communication between
different malicious components across the SoC.
Trojan Insertion Stage: It is assumed the Trojans are inserted in the RTL code
or higher-level model, meaning no golden RTL model exists to aid in Trojan detection
at later stages in the design cycle. A complex SoC requires hundreds of engineers to
design and test, and relies on third party IP and tools to meet time to market demands.
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A single rouge design engineer or malicious 3rd party IP or CAD tool vendor has the
potential to implement a Trojan communication channel.
4.3.2 Trojan Channel Components
The structure and size of the Trojan channel circuitry depends on the following:
1. Bus Topology: Determines necessity of FIFO and extra Leakage Conditions Logic
at receiver interface
2. Bus Protocol: Defines Leakage Conditions Logic and selection of signal(s) to
mark valid Trojan transactions
3. Trojan Channel Connectivity: Channel can be one-way or bi-directional, con-
tain an active or snooping sender, and involve information leakage between two
masters, two slaves, or a master and a slave
4. Data Width of Trojan Channel (k): number of bits leaked during a Trojan
transaction
5. FIFO Depth (d): FIFO used to buffer Trojan channel data if the receiver is busy
accepting valid bus transactions
Bus topology and protocol are selected by the system designer, whereas Trojan chan-
nel connectivity is chosen by the attacker. Data width (k) and Trojan FIFO depth (d)
are parameters selected by the attacker to trade-off performance and overhead of the
Trojan channel. The black-colored components in Figure 4.2 are necessary to implement
a Trojan communication channel for a shared bus topology, which is shown in Figure
4.3a. For this case, the Data and Control lines from the sender component are directly
visible at the receiver. The red-colored components in Figure 4.2 show the extra circuitry
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required to implement the channel in an interconnect with a MUX based topology, which
is shown in Figure 4.3b.
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Figure 4.3: Bus Topologies on Opposite Ends of the Area v. Throughput Spectrum
The sender and the receiver can be any master or slave component on the interconnect.
The goal of the Trojan channel is to use only pre-existing interconnect interfaces to pass
data from the sender to the receiver. For example, the line labeled Data in Figure 4.2
on the sender’s side could be the write data or read/write address port if the sender is
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a bus master and the read data port if the sender is a bus slave and vice versa for the
Data on the receiver’s side.
Since the Trojan data is transmitted using the same lines as normal bus traffic,
additional signaling must mark when valid Trojan data is being transmitted. These
signals are labeled as Control in Figure 4.2, and like the Trojan data, are mapped to pre-
existing data/address/control signals, meaning no additional interface ports are created.
The Leakage Conditions Logic is protocol dependent and examines signals at the sender’s
interconnect interface to determine when it is “safe” to replace the original bus signal
values with Trojan values.
4.3.3 Topology Dependent Trojan Channel Properties
All bus signals can be classified as address, data, or control signals, and additionally
classified as belonging to read and/or write functionality. The interconnect topology
specifies the degree of parallelism between the different categories of bus signals, and the
connectivity between masters and slaves [57].
Figures 4.3a and 4.3b show the read and write data channels for topologies sitting
at opposite ends of the area efficiency and channel throughput trade-off. Figure 4.3a
is the most area efficient, but can only support a single transaction at a time, whereas
Figure 4.3b contains significantly more circuitry, but can support multiple simultaneous
transactions.
In Figure 4.3a, all read and write transactions are visible to all bus components,
meaning no Trojan circuitry is required to simply snoop bus data. If a Trojan bus
component wishes to send information, the black-colored circuitry inside the sender block
of Figure 4.2 is required. In Figure 4.3b, data is not visible to a component uninvolved in
the transaction. Unlike Figure 4.3a, forming a channel between two slaves or two masters
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requires extra circuitry inside the interconnect, shown in red in Figure 4.2. Because the
signals at the sender’s interconnect interface are not visible at the receiver’s interface and
vice versa, new leakage conditions are required, which monitor the receiver’s interface and
determine when it is safe to leak data without altering valid bus transactions. Signals
available at the receiver’s interface must also be selected to implement the Data and
Control lines. The FIFO is necessary because leakage conditions at the sender and
receiver may not occur simultaneously.
4.3.4 Protocol Dependent Trojan Channel Properties
The specifics of the Leakage Conditions Logic, which produces leak s and leak r, and
the selection of Data and Control signals depend on the bus protocol used. Because of
the similarities between various bus protocols, a general procedure for determining the
Leakage Conditions Logic and the selection of Data and Control signals can be given.
Data Signal Selection
In order to remain stealthy, the Trojan cannot create additional signals to transmit
data, and must send data via pre-existing signals in the bus protocol. Being that the
primary purpose of a bus is to transmit data, all bus protocol/topology combinations
have signals that are suitable for sending/receiving Trojan data.
In a protocol with separate read and write data signals, selection depends on if the
Trojan Sender/Receiver resides in a master or slave component, since masters drive write
data and observe read data signals, and vice versa for slave components. If the Trojan
Sender resides in a master component, the read and write address signals can also be
used to send Trojan data.
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Leakage Conditions Logic
Since pre-existing bus signals are used to transmit Trojan data, logic ensuring that
normal bus operation is not compromised by the Trojan is necessary. The Leakage
Conditions Logic examines protocol control signals to identify when Trojan Data signals
are not being used to transmit valid data, and have unspecified values.
Every bus protocol clearly defines the conditions for which data, address, and error
reporting signals are valid. Some protocols, such as AXI4, designate a “valid” signal for
each data channel, while others such as APB use the current state within the protocol
to identify which signals are valid.
leak s is set when the Trojan Sender has data to transmit and the Data signals are
not involved in a valid transaction. If the Trojan Sender is leaking valid bus transactions
instead of actively sending information, then leak s is not needed. leak r is set when
there are items in the Trojan FIFO and the Data signals at the receiver interface are not
currently involved in a valid transaction.
Control Signal Selection
When a Trojan Data signal is not being used in a valid bus transaction, its value is
unspecified. During idle bus cycles, either Trojan data is being transmitted, or the bus is
truly idle, and no data (Trojan or valid) is sent. To distinguish between these two cases,
existing bus signals are selected to be Trojan Control signals, which mark when Trojan
data is on the bus.
The criteria for selecting these signals and their corresponding values is that when
leak s/leak r is asserted, the normal behavior of the signal is predictable, but also un-
specified. For most protocols, control signals are good candidates because they often are
unused during idle cycles, yet their values remain static when idle for a given implemen-
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tation.
4.4 Protocol Specific Trojan Channel Definitions
Following the general Trojan channel procedure outlined in Section 4.3.4, we present
the Leakage Conditions Logic and selection of Trojan Control and Data signals in detail
for two commonly used bus protocols from ARM: AMBA AXI4/AXI4-Lite and AMBA
APB in order to insert a Trojan in unspecified functionality.
AXI4 is a protocol designed for connecting high speed components such as proces-
sors, memory, and network controllers, and contains complex features to increase channel
throughput. In contrast, APB is a simple protocol designed to connect low speed periph-
erals such as UART, keyboard, and timer modules. In a typical SoC, components on the
APB bus are connected to the high speed bus via a bridging component [57].
4.4.1 AMBA AXI4
AXI4 defines 5 independent transaction channels seen at the interface of every master
and slave: read address channel, read data channel, write address channel, write data
channel, and write response channel [56]. Each channel uses the VALID/READY hand-
shake signal pair shown in Figure 4.1 to indicate when the receiver is ready to process
bus data, and to mark when valid data is on the bus. Typically, buses using AXI4
choose MUX-based configurations such as those shown in Figure 4.3b, meaning that the
red-colored circuitry in Figure 4.2 is required to create the Trojan channel.
The specific AXI4 signals selected to use as Data or Control signals depends on if the
sender and receiver are master or slave components.
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Master Sender
Data Signal Selection: If the sender is a bus master, data can be leaked through
any bus signals a master drives, mainly those on the read or write address channels, or
the write data channel. The values of all master driven signals on these channels have
no functional meaning when the channel VALID signal is low, hence:
leak s = troj data ready & ~VALID
Control Signal Selection: WSTRB is used in both AXI4 and AXI4-Lite, and
quoting the specification, “A master must ensure that the write strobes are HIGH only
for byte lanes that contain valid data. When WVALID is LOW, the write strobes
can take any value...” If the application uses all byte lanes in every transfer, it is
likely that all strobe bits would be kept HIGH, even when WVALID is LOW, so a good
indicator of a valid Trojan transaction would be to set 1 or more bits LOW when leak s
is asserted. If the interconnect services peripherals with data widths of 1, 2, and 4 bytes,
asserting exactly 3 out of 4 bits of WSTRB is a better option, since this set of values is
unlikely to be assigned to WSTRB during normal operation. The following assignment
of WSTRB (where WSTRB ORIG is the Trojan-free value of WSTRB) would work in
both cases:
WSTRB = leak s ? 4’b1011 : WSTRB ORIG
The signal WLAST is used to indicate the last transfer in a write burst transaction.
When WVALID is low, WLAST is not used, however almost certainly will be de-asserted,
meaning that asserting this signal can also mark a valid Trojan transaction:
WLAST = leak s ? 1 : WLAST ORIG
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Slave Sender
Data can be leaked through any bus signals a slave can drive (those on the read data
channel or write response channel). The logic for leak s is identical to the logic presented
in the previous section since both channels employ VALID signals. To mark when Trojan
data is valid, RLAST can be used in a similar manner as WLAST.
RRESP and BRESP are 2-bit error reporting signals and are typically set to indicate
“OKAY, normal access success” (all 0’s) when not in use (channel VALID is LOW).
Setting either RRESP or BRESP to a non-zero state when leak s is asserted can indicate
the presence of Trojan data on the bus, for example:
RRESP = leak s ? 2’b10 : RRESP ORIG
Trojan Receiver
A Trojan master/slave receives information on the same set of bus signals a Trojan
slave/master sends. Because of this symmetry, the selection of Data and Control signals
is identical to the previous sections. The only difference is that before leaking data to a
receiver, the FIFO must not be empty, meaning:
leak r = fifo not empty & ~VALID
4.4.2 AMBA APB
The bridging component is the only bus master in APB. The slave components have
their own slave select signal (PSELx), but typically share all read data (PRDATA) and
control signals (PREADY and PSLVERR) in an AND-OR configuration like the one
shown in Figure 4.3a.
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Figure 4.4: AMBA APB Transaction State Diagram [67]
Slave Sender
Since slaves can only drive PRDATA, PREADY, and PSLVERR, PRDATA is used
for Trojan Data and PREADY and PSLVERR are selected as the Trojan Control signals.
Since all 3 signals are visible to all bus components, the black-colored circuitry presented
in Figure 4.2 is sufficient to implement the Trojan channel.
Figure 4.4 shows the state diagram for an APB transaction. PRDATA is only valid
during the ACCESS state. The malicious slave leaks information by placing Trojan
data on PRDATA as not to conflict with a valid transaction, but can only place data
on PRDATA when PSELx is set, meaning information can only be leaked during the
SETUP state:
leak s = troj data ready & PSELx & ~PENABLE
Either PREADY or PSLVERR must be used to mark when valid data is on the
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Trojan channel. As seen in Figure 4.4, PREADY can take on any value during the
SETUP phase without affecting the behavior of a valid transaction. Similarly, quoting
the specification, “PSLVERR is only considered valid during the last cycle of an APB
transfer, when PSEL, PENABLE, and PREADY are all HIGH” [67]. The combination
of setting PSLVERR and de-asserting PREADY during the SETUP phase can be used
to signal valid Trojan data.
Master Sender
The APB bridge is the only bus master, and a malicious APB bridge component
can be used to connect a Trojan component from the high-speed bus with an APB bus
slave. The APB bridge can leak data over PWRITE during the IDLE state, and use
the combination of de-asserting all PSEL lines while asserting PENABLE to signal the
occurrence of a Trojan transaction.
4.5 AXI4-Lite Interconnect Trojan Example
The system shown in Figure 4.5 is created to verify the AXI4-Lite Interconnect Fabric
through RTL simulation. The two slaves are simple 8-bit adder coprocessors which receive
3 operands to add via the interconnect from 3 processors. Since the specifics of the main
processors are irrelevant, in the example infrastructure, they are replaced by AXI4-Lite
bus functional models (BFMs) from [68]. Additionally, AXI4-Lite assertions packaged
by ARM for protocol compliance checking [65] are active during system simulation.
The AXI4-Lite Interconnect Fabric IP block used is the LogiCORE IP AXI Inter-
connect (v1.02.a) from Xilinx [66] configured in Shared-Address Multiple-Data (SAMD)
mode (the topology shown in Figure 4.3b).
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Figure 4.6: Trojan Channel Logic for AXI4-Lite Interconnect
4.5.1 Trojan Operation
The AXI4-Lite Interconnect IP in Figure 4.5 is infected with two copies of the circuitry
shown in red in Figure 4.6 to allow S1 to snoop on read requests for S0 and vice versa.
Without the Trojan, the read data channel for S0 is not visible to S1 and vice versa.
The waveform in Figure 4.7 first demonstrates how 3 read data responses (values
42, 15, then 14) from S1 are snooped and routed to S0’s write channel, then shows a
single read data response (value 96) from S0 routed to S1’s write channel, and finally
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Table 4.1: Trojan-Free Design Results (After Place and Route)
Configuration # FF # LUT # BRAM
Frequency
[MHz]
3 Masters 2 Slaves 1814 2474 2 250
4 Masters 6 Slaves 3071 4247 3 250
another read data response from S1 (value 13) leaked to S0. All Trojan transactions are
highlighted in red in Figure 4.7. The WSTRB signal is used to indicate when leaked data
is on the bus. Normally WSTRB == 1, but when information is leaked, WSTRB == 9.
For AXI4-Lite, there are over 50 assertions monitoring bus signals during
simulation, and none of them are violated even when information is flowing
through the Trojan channel!
4.5.2 Overhead
To determine the area and timing overhead of implementing a 2-way Trojan channel
between S0 and S1, the SystemVerilog Testbench in Figure 4.5 is replaced by several
simple bus masters. Table 4.1 shows results for the Trojan-free design, after placement
and route, assuming 3 masters and 2 slaves (labeled as 3M2S) as well as 4 masters and
6 slaves (labeled as 4M6S) for a Virtex-7 FPGA (7vx330t-3).
Table 4.2 illustrates how the selection of Trojan channel parameters Data Width (k)
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Table 4.2: Area Overhead of 2-way HW-Trojan Channel
Data
FIFO Depth
% Increase in FF % Increase in LUT
Width 3M2S 4M6S 3M2S 4M6S
2
2 0.8 0.5 0.9 0.4
4 1.1 0.7 1.5 0.6
8 1.4 0.8 1.8 1.1
4
2 1.0 0.6 1.4 0.7
4 1.3 0.8 2.0 0.8
8 1.7 1.0 2.0 1.5
8
2 1.4 0.8 1.8 1.0
4 1.8 1.0 2.4 1.2
8 2.1 1.2 3.0 1.7
and FIFO Depth (d) affect the results. The Trojan channel does not affect the operating
frequency of the design, and stays within 3% of the original FF and LUT utilization.
As the number of masters and slaves increases, the interconnect and overall design area
increases, but the size of the Trojan circuitry does not change.
The Trojan channel is easier to hide as the complexity of the interconnect and the
number of components connected increases. The master and slave components used to
generate the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 are far simpler than those in a typical SoC,
so the results in Table 4.2 give a loose upper bound on the expected percentage of area
increase caused by the Trojan channel in a modern design.
4.6 Trojan Channel in SoC Implementation
To demonstrate how our proposed Trojan channel can give an attacker an extremely
powerful foothold in a complex system, we infest a Xilinx Zynq ARM processor based
SoC framework running a Linux OS with Trojan circuitry allowing an unprivileged user
access to root-user memory transactions. In this section, we detail the Trojan channel
operation, the interactions of users within the OS, and the area overhead of the Trojan.
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4.6.1 Zynq-7000 Based SoC Platform Overview
We design and implement a Trojan infested SoC architecture based on the Zynq-7000
programmable SoC platform in order to demonstrate the operation of the proposed Tro-
jan channel in a real-world application. A full SoC environment running multi-user Linux
is created containing Trojan infected Interconnect and Block RAM (BRAM) Controller
IP allowing an unprivileged user to observe any data transferred via the Central Direct
Memory Access (CDMA) Controller.
A block diagram of the SoC architecture is shown in Figure 4.8. The SoC architecture
includes (1) ARM processors running a multi-user Linux OS, (2) an on-chip memory
(OCM) available to all users, but managed by the kernel to ensure memory isolation
and privacy, (3) a central direct memory access (CDMA) controller only accessible by a
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user with root privileges which performs direct memory transfers from a source address
to a destination address and (4) a BRAM component which can be accessed directly by
any user. Components communicate through several AXI Interconnect blocks, the most
relevant labeled as (5) and (6) in Figure 4.8. The ARM cores access the CDMA and
BRAM peripherals through (5), and in (6) the CDMA initiates read/write transactions
to the BRAM and on-chip memory.
The system is created using Vivado 2015.1 [69] targeting the Zynq-7000 All-Programmable
SoC found in the Zedboard platform [70]. The Zynq-7000 architecture integrates two
ARM Cortex-A9 cores, on-chip memory, and other peripherals, designated as the Pro-
cessing System (PS) with Xilinx Programmable Logic (PL) [71]. The Processing System
provides the necessary resources to run Xillinux [72], a multi-user Linux distribution,
while the flexibility of the Programmable Logic allows for Trojan insertion.
4.6.2 Hardware Trojan Operation
Figure 4.9 illustrates how Trojan circuitry inserted in the BRAM Controller and AXI
Interconnect enables an unprivileged user program to observe memory transfers made by
root. First, a root program must initiate a DMA transfer by writing to control registers in
the CDMA. The most basic DMA transfer requires specifying the Source Address (SA),
Destination Address (DA), and number of Bytes to Transfer (BTT) [73]. Once the BTT
register is written, the DMA transfer is performed by issuing read and write transactions
to the relevant peripheral (in Figure 4.9 the CDMA is transferring data between two
locations in on-chip memory). This flow is illustrated by blue arrows in Figure 4.9. The
following steps, shown using red arrows in Figure 4.9, illustrate Trojan operation:
1. AXI Bus Trojan leaks transactions visible only at the OCM slave interface to the
BRAM slave interface
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Figure 4.9: Hardware Trojan Operation
2. BRAM Trojan captures leaked data at the AXI interface, stores at incrementing
BRAM memory locations
3. Malicious unprivileged user program reads BRAM locations containing the leaked
data
One should note that even if an attacker does not have the ability to run or infiltrate
a software program running on the SoC, information from the Trojan channel can be
captured and transmitted to the attacker using only hardware Trojans. For example,
instead of leaking the DMA transfer data to BRAM, a Trojan infested Ethernet or
UART Controller could be used to send data to an attacker.
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4.7 Details of Trojan Insertion in Xilinx IP
Each block in the Programmable Logic portion of Figure 4.8 corresponds to a Verilog
or VHDL module provided by Xilinx, with Vivado integrating the IP into a complete
system. Trojans are inserted in the AXI4 Interconnect and AXI BRAM Controller IP.
AXI4 Interconnect
The AXI Interconnect block labeled (6) in Figure 4.8 has a single bus master (the
CDMA) and two slaves. The Verilog file, axi crossbar v2 1 axi crossbar.v, from AXI
Interconnect 2.1 (Rev. 5) [74] is modified to insert the Trojan into this block.
Because there is only a single bus master, the 32-bit write data is broadcast to both
of the slaves. Even though the BRAM slave can observe write data destined for the
processing system, WVALID signals are not broadcast, meaning only the processing
system knows which cycle the data is valid. Trojan circuitry is needed to notify the
BRAM slave when valid data is being sent to the processing system.
Similar to the example in Section 4.5, the 4-bit WSTRB signal seen at the BRAM
slave interface is used to mark when valid data is being written to the processing system.
Since the BRAM data width is 32 bits, WSTRB is always 4’b1111. The Trojan circuitry
sets WSTRB to 4’b1110 to mark when data is being written to the processing system.
Since there is only one bus master, valid write data can never be sent to BRAM
and the processing system simultaneously, guaranteeing that valid write transactions to
BRAM are not disrupted when the Trojan alters WSTRB. This eliminates the need for
Trojan FIFO or buffering circuitry.
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Figure 4.10: Demonstration Environment
AXI BRAM Controller
The Trojan inserted in the AXI BRAM Controller, labeled (4) in Figure 4.8, captures
WDATA (32-bits) when WSTRB is 4’b1110, then writes the data to Port B of the BRAM.
In our example framework, the address the leaked data is written to starts at 0x70000000,
then increases by 4 with every data word written.
The VHDL file, full axi.vhd, from AXI BRAM Controller v4.0 [75] is modified by
adding a counter to increment the BRAM address for the leaked data and logic to monitor
the AXI write data channel and write the leaked data to the BRAM.
4.7.1 OS-Level Extraction of Trojan Channel Information
Figure 4.10 shows the demonstration environment. Xillinux runs on an SD card
located on the Zedboard, and a USB/UART cable connects a desktop workstation to
a Xillinux root terminal. The demo uses two Xillinux users: root and attacker. The
privileged user root can read/write directly to physical addresses using a program called
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access addr while attacker is unprivileged, and cannot use this program.
However, to allow non-privileged users access to the BRAM, the executable read bram
runs with root privileges, but can be executed by any user, and reads the first 10 locations
in the BRAM. The read bram program can be thought of as a very simple device driver
since it provides an unprivileged user with controlled and limited access to a peripheral.
In the demo, root uses the DMA controller to transfer the contents at address 0x4
to address 0x8 (both on-chip memory locations). In the system memory map, on-chip
memory addresses start at 0x0, the CDMA base address is 0x60000000, and the BRAM
base addresses is 0x70000000.
Figure 4.11 shows Xillinux terminal output during the demonstration of Trojan func-
tionality. Note that the commands at the beginning of the demo are executed as root.
(1) Data at addresses 0x4 and 0x8 are read using access addr. (2-4) CDMA registers
are written, instructing the CDMA to transfer 4 bytes of data from address 0x4 to
address 0x8. (5) access addr is used to confirm that the correct data from address 0x4
(0xe12fff10) is written to address 0x8. (6) The demo switches to the perspective of the
attacker user. Notice that attacker tries to execute access addr to learn the contents
of addresses 0x4 and 0x8, but does not have sufficient privileges to do so. (7) Because of
the hardware Trojan, the attacker is able to recover the data transferred by root using
read bram.
4.7.2 Overhead
Table 4.3 shows the overhead of inserting the Trojan circuitry in the AXI Interconnect
and BRAM Controller IP. The Trojan channel data width is 32 bits, and the interconnect
topology is such that no FIFO is necessary. The utilization results given are for the
Programmable Logic portion of the platform, since the Processing System exists on the
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Figure 4.11: OS-Level Trojan Demonstration Shell Commands
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Table 4.3: Overhead of Programmable Logic in SoC Platform (After Place-and-Route)
# FF # LUT
# Memory # Block Freq.
LUT RAMs [MHz]
Trojan-Free 4766 4149 267 1 50
Trojan-Infested 4809 4201 267 1 50
% Increase 0.9 1.2 0 0 0
FPGA board as hard silicon, and cannot be modified or further optimized by Vivado.
The presence of the Trojan circuitry did not affect the frequency of the design, and the
FF and LUT utilization rose by approximately 1% making the Trojan circuitry unlikely
to be detected due to anomalous area consumption.
4.8 Detection Strategies
To guarantee that no Trojan channel exists in the interconnect circuitry, one straightfor-
ward procedure is to:
1. Fully specify the behavior of every bus signal
2. Modify the bus implementation to comply with the fully refined specification
3. Formally prove the bus implementation conforms to the behavior specified in 1)
Even if the requirement for formal verification is replaced by assertions monitoring
the interconnect during simulation, for complex protocols, the task of complete behavior
specification without causing unacceptable overhead is formidable. For example, in AXI4,
it is easy to require that if a channel VALID signal is LOW, all other channel signals must
be driven LOW. However, given that data and address buses in AXI4 are typically 32 or
64 bits wide, an implementation adhering to this requirement must augment hundreds
of bits with MUX circuitry to switch between LOW and the original signal value.
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To overcome the large area and power overhead of zeroing circuitry for data and
address signals, this circuitry can be implemented only for signals that have the potential
to become Trojan channel Control signals (ex. WSTRB and WLAST). Preventing the
ability to signal when Trojan transactions occur greatly decreases the usability of the
Trojan channel.
If no zeroing circuitry can be afforded, the Trojan channel can be targeted by de-
veloping additional complex assertions, which define the behavior of bus signals during
invalid cycles in a less straight forward, but more area efficient way. For example, instead
of requiring WSTRB == 0 when VALID is LOW, a test bench monitor can record the
value of WSTRB during the most recent valid write transaction and require that this
value remain unchanged until the next valid transaction.
Developing complex assertions and test bench code to minimize the overhead of defin-
ing unspecified behavior still may not be feasible depending on the amount of effort bud-
geted for design verification, as the development of assertions and code must be done
manually. To avoid both the area and timing overhead of defining unspecified function-
ality and the cost of increasing test bench complexity, we introduce an automated Trojan
detection methodology in Chapter 5 based on formal methods which is capable of detect-
ing the bus Trojans proposed in this chapter without requiring specification refinement.
The detection methodology determines if the values of bus signals can propagate to design
boundaries when they are unspecified without actually having to define desired values
for the bus signals during idle cycles. If any bus component is receiving information from
a Trojan channel, this method will flag that component as containing a Trojan.
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4.9 Summary
In this chapter we present a new type of Hardware Trojan which creates a covert
communication channel between components spread across an SoC using only existing
on-chip bus signals without affecting normal bus functionality [25]. We illustrate how our
Trojan channel model is applicable to any bus topology and protocol, and give details for
two widely used protocols. Our Trojan channel circuitry is shown to avoid detection by a
protocol compliance checking suite from the IP vendor, and confirmed to have manageable
area overhead. We also illustrate how Trojan channel information can be extracted by
malicious unprivileged software by creating a complete SoC platform infected with a bus
Trojan. Additionally, several detection strategies are outlined.
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Chapter 5
Detecting Hardware Trojans in
Unspecified Functionality
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we present a Trojan detection methodology for Trojans modifying only
unspecified design functionality. Prior chapters have proposed different Trojans in this
space such as Trojans modifying RTL don’t cares to leak information (Chapter 2) and
Trojans which create covert communication channels (Chapter 4), however we have still
not provided a detection methodology, only prevention techniques which must be applied
to a Trojan-free design (Chapter 2) and identification of unspecified design functionality
which could potentially be modified by an attacker (Chapter 3). The method presented
in this chapter provides the ability to actually classify unspecified functionality as being
Trojan-infested or Trojan-free and can detect the Trojans proposed in prior chapters.
We formulate the detection problem in terms of information leakage by making the
observation that if a signal, x, is unspecified under a condition C, the value of x should
not be able to propagate to important points in the design such as registers or primary
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outputs, and if it can, Trojan circuitry is present or a design bug exists. This observation
can be concisely expressed as a satisfiability problem, allowing us to take advantage of
the recent advances in both boolean and satisfiability modulo theory (SMT) solvers.
The main contributions of this chapter are:
1. A general detection methodology for Trojans in unspecified functionality which can
be followed using a wide variety of tools and techniques
2. A precise formulation for “dangerous” unspecified functionality expressed as a sat-
isfiability problem
3. A method to detect the Trojan communication channels proposed in [25] which
are formed by only modify signals in common on-chip bus protocols when they are
unspecified
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 explores related work
in information flow analysis, Section 5.3 gives the threat model, Section 5.4 precisely
formulates the detection problem, Section 5.5 details our detection methodology, Section
5.6 demonstrates the effectiveness and quantifies the overhead of our method using several
example designs, and we summarize the chapter in Section 5.7.
5.2 Related Work: Information Flow Analysis
Information flow analysis techniques verify security properties such as confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. There exists a large body of work on how to specify and verify
these properties for software (ex. [76, 77]), as well as several methods for analysis of
information flow in hardware [78, 79, 80] and firmware [81].
Information flow properties specify the conditions under which information can safely
flow between signals in a design. A whitelist of such properties describes the proper access
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and disclosure mechanisms for all important signals, and the design is analyzed to detect
violations of the specified properties. Our analysis instead focuses on creating a list of
signals and the conditions under which they are functionally meaningless, then making
the observation that it is suspicious for information to flow from a signal anywhere in the
design when it is unspecified. The threat model addressed is different, but our problem
can be formulated in terms of information leakage properties.
For example, the Cadence JasperGold Security Path Verification App [82] is a com-
mercial tool which formally proves the existence/lack of a path from a source to desti-
nation signal. We did not have access to this tool, but we suspect that our detection
formulation can be transformed into a set of properties compatible with the Security Path
Verification App. In this work we focus on providing a concise theoretical formulation
for Trojan detection, and provide several (but certainly not all possible ways) to solve
the problem.
5.3 Threat Model
Our method aims to detect Trojans using design inputs or internal signals when they
are unspecified to modify other design signals in a malicious, but covert manner. These
Trojans never violate the design specification, and hide completely within unspecified
design functionality.
For example, consider a peripheral with registers visible to unprivileged software
connected to the same on-chip bus as a memory controller. The Trojans proposed in
Chapter 4 allow an attacker to leak information such as memory accesses from the root
user to the bus interface of this easily accessible peripheral when signals in the interface
are not being used for valid bus transactions. The peripheral could then transfer the
leaked information to unused addresses in the register space or unused bit fields in existing
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registers allowing a malicious, but unprivileged, software program access to sensitive data.
Trojan Insertion Stage: It is assumed that no golden RTL model exists to aid in
Trojan detection during later stages in the design cycle, meaning that it is possible for
Trojans to be inserted in the RTL code or higher-level model. Hundreds of engineers are
involved in the design and test of a silicon chip. A single malicious 3rd party IP provider,
CAD tool vendor, or disgruntled engineer has the ability to insert a Trojan in the RTL
code.
5.4 Problem Formulation
For a hardware design f , let x be a signal in f which is unspecified under condition
C. For a given hardware design, there will be many (x, C) pairs. The targeted Trojans
will insert malicious functionality by modifying x during C.
Key insight: Instead of enumerating and targeting every possible Trojan in this
space, we observe that any functionality the attacker inserts must eventually influence
design outputs or modify design state otherwise it is redundant. While malicious func-
tionality is not redundant, by definition unspecified functionality should be, and this
allows us to formulate the problem without modeling Trojan functionality or defining
“expected” behavior for the unspecified functionality. The only assumption made is that
when x is unspecified, its value should never influence any key points in the design.
Determining if x influences circuit output under C can be formulated as a satisfiability
problem. If Equation 5.1 is satisfiable, two different values of x (x0 and x1) result in
differences in circuit output under C, which is not consistent with properties of unspecified
functionality meaning the existence of Trojan circuitry or a design bug is likely.
C ∧ (fx→x0 ⊕ fx→x1) (5.1)
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A Motivating Example: We return again to the simple FIFO example in Figure
1.2 in Chapter 1. Because the Trojan circuitry never affects FIFO read functionality, it
is unlikely to be detected by existing verification methodologies. The value of read data
when read enable = 0 is unspecified because it is assumed that any circuitry in the fan-
out of read data will only propagate or store its value when a valid FIFO read occurs.
It would be a waste of precious verification resources to specify and verify the value
of read data when read enable = 0, however verifying that the FIFO is Trojan-free
only involves defining the (x, C) pairs (read data, read enable = 0) and (write data,
write enable = 0) and determining the satisfiability of Equation 5.1 for each pair.
5.4.1 Identifying (x, C) Pairs
There are several approaches, based on work presented in Chapters 3 and 4, that
can be used to identify (x, C) pairs for a design. An automated approach, applicable
to any design type, uses the mutation testing based technique proposed in Chapter 3 in
which undetected mutants affecting attacker observable signals are flagged as dangerous
because an attacker can modify behavior related to the mutant to leak information. A
signal differing under a dangerous mutant, and the corresponding condition under which
the difference occurs form an (x, C) pair.
Because mutation testing is expensive, another approach is to define (x, C) pairs
manually for specific classes of designs. Identifying a complete list of (x, C) pairs for a
complex design may not always be possible, however the more pairs included for analysis
results in greater confidence in the security of the design. For designs with on-chip bus
interfaces, it is straightforward to comprehensively list (x, C) pairs involving bus signals
for several well known standard bus protocols. The example designs used to demonstrate
the effectiveness of our detection method in Section 5.6 give details for the AXI4-Lite
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and Wishbone protocols.
5.5 Detection Methodology
5.5.1 Overview
Our detection methodology is given in Figure 5.1. Before any (x, C) pairs are ana-
lyzed, an SMT or boolean formula, o, is built for each primary output by traversing the
data-flow graph or synthesizing the design.
Then for each (x, C) pair, and primary output o in f :
1. Replace x with new variables x0 and x1 respectively in 2 identical copies of o
2. If SAT (C ∧ (ox→x0 ⊕ ox→x1)), flag signal x as dangerous for involvement in Trojan
circuitry
3. Inspect design behavior and code activated by the satisfying assignment
If f is an RTL design written in Verilog or VHDL, the analysis can be performed
on 1) formulas containing only boolean variables and logical connectives, or 2) formulas
containing symbols and operators whose semantic meaning is derived from a theory (ex.
the +, −, ×, <, ≥ operators all have behavior described by the theory of arithmetic and
commonly appear in Verilog/VHDL code).
Determining the satisfiability of formulas containing symbols and operators governed
by the theory of integers, bit vectors, and arrays requires Satisfiability Modulo Theory
(SMT) solvers [27]. In Section 5.5.2 we detail how to construct SMT formulas for each
circuit output directly from Verilog code (meaning no synthesis tool is required) and use
PySMT [83] to perform Step 2 in the detection procedure.
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Figure 5.1: Detection Methodology
The satisfiability of boolean formulas can be determined using a SAT solver, but the
approach we present in Section 5.5.3 leverages the robustness and scalability of commer-
cial equivalence checking tools (ex. Cadence Conformal [36]) in which a gate-level model
for f produced using logic synthesis is analyzed.
5.5.2 SMT Formulas from RTL Code
Pyverilog [84], an open-source Verilog code parser and static analysis tool written in
Python is used to build a data-flow graph for each primary output. To construct the
data-flow graph, Pyverilog first builds an abstract syntax tree (AST) representation from
the Verilog code and creates a table with information about ports, signals, and constants
found in each Verilog module. Then, the AST is traversed again to determine the scope of
each signal and resolve all parameters and constants in the design hierarchy, and finally a
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Figure 5.2: Data-flow Graph for simple.data out Generated by Pyverilog
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third pass of the AST creates an assignment tree for every signal describing the complete
data-flow.
Figure 5.2 shows the data-flow graph generated by Pyverilog for the signal data out
(an output in the Verilog module simple). The Verilog code for data out is given in
Listing 5.1.
Listing 5.1: simple.v
1
2 module s imple ( c lk , r s t , data in , read , write , data out , o u t v a l i d
) ;
3
4 input c lk , r s t , read , wr i t e ;
5 input [ 7 : 0 ] da ta in ;
6 output reg [ 7 : 0 ] data out ;
7 output reg o u t v a l i d ;
8
9 wire [ 1 : 0 ] read ptr , w r i t e p t r ;
10 reg [ 7 : 0 ] f i r s t r e g , second reg , t h i r d r e g , f o u r t h r e g ;
11 . . .
12 // da ta ou t l o g i c
13 always @(posedge c l k ) begin
14 i f ( read )
15 case ( r ead pt r )
16 2 ’ b00 : data out <= f i r s t r e g ;
17 2 ’ b01 : data out <= second reg ;
18 2 ’ b10 : data out <= t h i r d r e g ;
19 2 ’ b11 : data out <= f o u r t h r e g ;
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20 endcase
21 end
22 . . .
23 endmodule
Data-flow graph nodes fall into the following categories: branches, operators (logic,
arithmetic, etc.), bit vector slicing and concatenation, constants, and terminals. Our
detection methodology builds the formula for each output, o, using Python functions
provided by PySMT [83] to create symbols/variables, and describe bit vector, arithmetic,
and boolean operations based on the nodes encountered in the data-flow graph.
PySMT provides functions to build formulas involving several theories such as Lin-
ear Real Arithmetic (LRA), Real Difference Logic (RDL), Equalities and Uninterpreted
Functions (EUF), and Bit-Vectors (BV), then calls existing solvers such as MathSAT
[85], Z3 [86], CVC4 [87], Yices 2 [88], CUDD [89], PicoSAT [90], and Boolector [91] to
determine if the formula is satisfiable based on the theories present [83].
For each output, all nodes in the data-flow graph generated by Pyverilog are processed
by a recursive traversal procedure which returns sub-formulas for each node. Branches,
operators, constants, and bit vector operation nodes are straightforward, as PySMT has
good support for constructing expressions with boolean and arithmetic bit-vector oper-
ations. New variables in the formula are created when terminal nodes are encountered.
Terminal nodes in the graph correspond to intermediate reg and wire Verilog variables
in all modules, inputs and outputs for modules instantiated by the top module, and
primary inputs for the top module. If the terminal is a primary input for the top module,
a new formula variable is either created or retrieved from a table containing formula
variables already encountered during processing. Otherwise, a formula for the reg/wire
variable, input, or output is built by exploring its data-flow graph and then stored in a
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table to avoid repeated analysis.
The formula built from traversing the graph in Figure 5.2 would contain the simple.read
variable because it is a primary input, but the nodes corresponding to simple.read ptr,
simple.first reg, simple.second reg, etc. have their own data-flow graphs which are
traversed to produce formulas in terms of primary inputs.
One should note that signals corresponding to state elements in the design will ref-
erence themselves in the data-flow graph. If this situation is encountered, the variable
will become a symbol in the formula to avoid an infinite processing loop. Eventually,
the formulas for primary outputs will only reference primary input variables and state
variables.
PySMT functions are used to construct Equation 5.2.
C ∧ (ox→x0 ⊕ ox→x1) (5.2)
The exclusive-or and conjunction operators have corresponding functions in PySMT, and
the substitute function is used to create ox→x0 and ox→x1 , where x0 and x1 are new
independent variables. If Equation 5.2 is satisfiable, PySMT provides a model, or one
set of possible satisfying assignments for all variables in Equation 5.2 (including the new
variables x0 and x1) proving that x can influence o under C.
5.5.3 Equivalence Checking
The applicability of the Trojan detection procedure described in Section 5.5.2 to com-
mercial hardware designs is limited by the robustness of the Pyverilog parser and the
efficiency and usability of the available open-source SMT solvers. While the available
SMT solvers are able to handle incredibly large and complex formulas, reliable transfor-
mation of all possible constructs in Verilog/VHDL code to the input format required by
95
Detecting Hardware Trojans in Unspecified Functionality Chapter 5
SMT solvers does not exist.
On the other hand, logic equivalence checking for hardware designs is a mature, scal-
able and robust technology, with several commercial tools available. We present a way to
perform the detection procedure outlined in Section 5.5.1 using Cadence Conformal LEC
[36], the advantage being employing a tool already part of the circuit design workflow.
One disadvantage of this approach is that if x is a multi-bit signal, the satisfiability
of Equation 5.1 must be determined for each bit in x separately. Because equivalence
checking compares two gate-level designs, it is impossible to symbolically replace x, a
multi-bit signal, with x0 in one version and x1 in the other unless x is a single bit.
To determine the satisfiability of Equation 5.1 using Conformal, 1) two versions of
the design must be created assigning a single bit in x to 0 in one version and 1 in the
other, and 2) equivalence should be proven only under C.
To form the two circuit versions, LEC has two commands: add primary input and
add pin constraints, that force arbitrary signals in the design to 0 or 1 in the golden
or revised versions of the circuit. Ignoring equivalence checking results under certain
conditions is accomplished in LEC using the $constraint function. For example, if a
and b are design signals, inserting $constraint(a==1 && b==1) in the design source
code forces LEC to ignore counterexamples requiring a or b to be 0.
5.6 Case Studies
To validate our detection methodology, we infest two designs, 1) an adder copro-
cessor, and 2) a Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter (UART) communication
controller, with Trojans modifying unspecified functionality to leak information. The
inserted Trojans covertly receive information from the bus interface during idle cycles,
and then modify unspecified design functionality either to store the information for later
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Table 5.1: Results Summary: Size of Example Designs and Total Analysis Time For
All (x, C) Pairs
Design
Lines of Code # 2NAND Time (sec.)
Orig. Trj. Orig. Trj. Orig. Trj.
Adder 614 616 839 877 0.61 0.69
UART 2269 2273 5829 5836 8.59 8.63
retrieval by the attacker or transmit the information outside the chip. The Trojans cre-
ated for the case studies are non-trivial and representative of malicious functionality that
can be inserted into any bus peripheral, which in a typical SoC includes most IP blocks.
The on-chip bus is a critical component, and a high value target for an attacker.
We apply both versions of the detection methodology (SMT solving and equivalence
checking) to the designs in order to demonstrate the strengths and weaknesses of both ap-
proaches. The Trojans inserted in both designs are successfully identified by the method
employing an SMT solver, and in Section 5.6.3 we discuss the limitations of using equiv-
alence checking tools for Trojan detection.
Table 5.1 summarizes the experimental results, giving the size of the two original and
Trojan-infested designs in lines of code and 2-input NAND gates. The gate count was
determined by synthesizing the design using Synopsys Design Compiler (ver I-2013.12-
SP2) with a freely available 45nm technology library from NanGate [92]. Table 5.1 also
lists the total time in seconds spent on Trojan detection using the SMT solving approach.
This includes parsing all design files and building the data-flow graph for each signal in
addition to determining the satisfiability of Equation 5.2 for each (x, C) pair and primary
output. The experiments were run on a Dell Optiplex 960 computer with 8GB RAM.
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5.6.1 Adder Coprocessor
A simple coprocessor takes input from an AMBA AXI4-Lite [56] bus interface. This
coprocessor adds 3 8-bit values: a, b, and c. The programmer communicates with the
coprocessor by reading and writing to registers in the peripheral.
Trojan Description
Although the registers in the adder coprocessor are allocated 32-bits in the addressing
scheme, many only use a single bit. For example, the user writes to the least significant
bit of the b ap vld register to indicate that the b operand is valid, and the rest of the bits
go unused. The inserted Trojan circuitry takes advantage of this fact by storing 4 bits
of data leaked over the bus interface in b ap vld[5:1] for a malicious software program to
read. Unused register bits are an example of unspecified functionality common in many
designs, making the inserted Trojan an ideal example to test our detection strategy.
It is assumed that the leaked data is otherwise not accessible by the adversary and
they have access to registers in the coprocessor. The data is leaked using the Trojan
communication channel proposed in Chapter 4, which only alters bus signals at the
coprocessor’s interface when they are not in use. While the inserted Trojan modifies
unspecified functionality present in the AXI4-Lite protocol, insertion of Trojan commu-
nication channels generalizes to all bus protocols and interconnect topologies.
4-bit Trojan data is delivered on the AXI-Lite write data channel signal WDATA[3:0]
when ¬WVALID ∧ WSTRB== 4′b1111. The Trojan residing in the coprocessor recog-
nizes that when WSTRB== 4′b1111, the data present on the WDATA signal is from the
Trojan communication channel and then stores WDATA[3:0] in b ap vld[5:1].
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Table 5.2: Trojan Detection Results for Adder Coprocessor: Analysis Time in Seconds,
and Outputs SAT for Each (x, C) Pair
x C Time, Outputs SAT
Orig. Trj.
AWADDR[31:0] ¬AWVALID 0.13, None 0.13, None
WDATA[31:0] ¬WVALID 0.13, None 0.17, RDATA
WSTRB[3:0] ¬WVALID 0.13, None 0.17, RDATA
ARADDR[31:0] ¬ARVALID 0.10, None 0.10, None
Description of (x, C) Pairs
Input to the adder coprocessor module comes from the AXI4-Lite bus interface. AXI4
defines 5 independent transaction channels seen at the interface of every master and slave,
with each channel employing a VALID/READY handshake signal pair to indicate when
the receiver is ready to process bus data, and to mark when valid data is on the bus. We
refer the reader to [56] for further detail on the AXI4-Lite protocol.
From the perspective of Trojan detection, we wish to determine if any information
received on the bus interface on any channel while the channel VALID signal is 0 can
influence any data read out from the registers of the adder coprocessor. Since the adder
coprocessor is a bus slave, the inputs (x signals) are those shown in the first column of
Table 5.2, with C being the condition that the corresponding channel VALID signal is 0.
The signals listed in Table 5.2 cover all the inputs to the adder coprocessor exclud-
ing the clock and reset signals, meaning that this list of (x, C) pairs is complete for
guaranteeing that the adder is not processing leaked information.
Detection Results
The primary outputs for the adder coprocessor are shown in Table 5.3 along with the
number of nodes in the data-flow graph for each output in the Trojan-free and Trojan-
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Table 5.3: Number of Nodes in the Data-Flow Graph for Each Primary Output in the
Adder Coprocessor Design
Output Name
# Nodes
Orig. Trj.
AWREADY 45 45
WREADY 45 45
BRESP[1:0] 2 2
BVALID 45 45
ARREADY 34 34
RDATA[31:0] 12507 16505
RRESP[1:0] 2 2
RVALID 34 34
interrupt 3294 4326
infested versions of the design. The satisfiability of Equation 5.2 is determined for every
output in Table 5.3 for every (x, C) pair in Table 5.2. Each row in Table 5.2 gives the
time taken (in seconds) to build and analyze Equation 5.2 for all outputs using a specific
(x, C) pair and lists any outputs for which Equation 5.2 was satisfiable (if any) for both
the Trojan-free and Trojan-infested versions of the adder.
For the Trojan-free design, none of the (x, C) pairs were able to influence primary
outputs, which is consistent with our assumption that unspecified functionality should
not be capable of significantly affecting design behavior. For the Trojan-infested design,
our analysis was able to highlight the signals involved in the Trojan circuitry. WDATA
and WSTRB are shown to influence RDATA, which is expected, because the Trojan
alters the contents of the b ap vld register, which can be read by an AXI4-Lite read
request. The read and write address signals are not involved in the Trojan, and are not
flagged by our detection methodology.
The adder coprocessor design is also analyzed using the detection methodology version
requiring Conformal, presented in Section 5.5.3, and produces results identical to those
shown in Table 5.2.
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5.6.2 UART Communication Controller
We also validate our detection methodology on a UART circuit from OpenCores [54]
designed to interface with a host processor through a Wishbone Bus Interface [55].
Trojan Description
To transmit data serially on the UART output stx pad o, 8 bits are written to the
UART transmit data register through a Wishbone write transaction. Normally only a
bus master is able to issue write requests and cause the UART to transmit data, however
if a Trojan communication channel is inserted inside the Wishbone bus, it is possible for
another slave to covertly signal the Trojan inserted in the UART controller, and cause
data to be serially transmitted outside the chip.
The Trojan inserted in the UART allows writes to UART registers when the signal
wb sel i == 4′b1001. The Wishbone bus uses 32-bit data signals, but the UART registers
are only 8-bits wide. wb sel i marks which byte lanes contain valid data. For the UART
controller, any values of wb sel i with Hamming Weight > 1 are “don’t care.”
In addition to wb sel i, there are several additional control signals seen at the UART
bus interface driven by the bus master. wb cyc i indicates if a valid bus transaction is
in progress, wb stb i selects the slave, and wb we i indicates if the transaction is read or
write since the address signal is shared by read and write transactions.
A valid write transaction is marked by we o, whose assignment is given by the fol-
lowing code:
assign we o = ( wb we is & wb stb i & wb cyc i & wbstate==2’b10 ) ;
The Trojan modifies this assignment to the following:
assign we o = ( wb we is & wb stb i & wb cyc i & wbstate==2’b10 )
| ( w b s e l i s == 4 ’ b1001 & ˜ r e o ) ;
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Table 5.4: Trojan Detection Results for UART Core: Analysis Time in Seconds, and
Outputs SAT for Each (x, C) Pair
x C Time, Outputs SAT
Orig. Trj.
wb adr i[4:0] ¬wb stb i ∨
¬wb cyc i
1.54, None 1.63, (int o, dtr pad o, stx pad o,
rts pad o, baud o)
wb dat i[31:0] ¬wb stb i ∨
¬wb we i ∨
¬wb cyc i
3.00, None 2.82, (int o, dtr pad o, stx pad o,
rts pad o, baud o)
wb sel i[3:0] ¬wb stb i ∨
¬wb we i ∨
¬wb cyc i
2.95, None 3.07, (int o, dtr pad o, wb ack o,
stx pad o, rts pad o, baud o)
This modification allows registers to be written to even when the slave is not selected
or a valid transaction is not occurring, provided a read transaction is not taking place.
Description of (x, C) Pairs
Table 5.4 gives the (x, C) pairs analyzed. Similar to the adder coprocessor, the goal
is to determine if bus signals can significantly affect the design during conditions in
which they are functionally irrelevant. Since the UART is a bus slave, the inputs are the
Wishbone address, data, and select signals, which are unspecified when the slave is not
selected (¬wb stb i), or a valid bus cycle is not in progress (¬wb cyc i). The data and
select signals are also unspecified when a read transaction is taking place (¬wb we i).
Detection Results
Table 5.5 lists all the primary outputs in the UART design along with the number
of nodes in the data-flow graph for each output in the Trojan-free and Trojan-infested
versions. The outputs wb dat o, int o, and stx pad o all have a large number of nodes
due to the presence of variables assigned within case statements with many branches and
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Table 5.5: Number of Nodes in the Data-Flow Graph for Each Primary Output in the
UART Design
Output Name
# Nodes
Orig. Trj.
wb dat o[31:0] 1.48× 1017 3.79× 1017
wb ack o 109 159
int o 8.45× 1016 21.6× 1016
stx pad o 1.35× 109 3.45× 109
rts pad o 586 1426
dtr pad o 586 1426
baud o 5492 13732
several FIFO memories.
Memory representation could be simplified by using the theory of arrays instead of
transforming all instances of Verilog arrays into a case statement in which a separate reg
variable for each memory word is assigned based on the address signal, however PySMT
currently does not provide any functions for constructing formulas with arrays.
Despite the large graph sizes, solving Equation 5.2 for all primary outputs for each (x,
C) pair takes only a few seconds, as seen in Table 5.4. For the Trojan-free design, there
were no false positives, again consistent with our assumption that bus signals should not
influence the rest of the peripheral when they are not being used in a valid transaction.
Table 5.4 also shows that the Trojan circuitry uses wb adr i and wb dat i in addition to
wb sel i. This matches the behavior of the Trojan, which allows any data to be written
to any register as long as wb sel i = 4′b1001.
5.6.3 SMT Solving v. Equivalence Checking
We attempted to use the method presented Section 5.5.3 to analyze the UART design
using equivalence checking, however ran into an issue resulting from the fact that most
of the bus signals, (wb dat i, wb sel i, etc.) are latched before use in certain portions of
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the code, whereas the bus signals in the adder coprocessor were never stored.
Conformal is a combinational equivalence checking tool, meaning any inputs to stor-
age elements are considered outputs of the combinational logic (pseudo-primary outputs)
and all outputs from storage elements are treated as circuit inputs (pseudo-primary in-
puts). If x is a direct flip-flop input (ex. in data path pipelining), x is a pseudo-primary
output during combinational equivalence checking, meaning fx=0 and fx=1 are trivially
non-equivalent because a pseudo-primary output is tied to different static values in both
versions. If non-equivalence of pseudo-primary outputs is ignored, and only actual pri-
mary outputs are compared, any Trojans using different values of x (and by extension,
different values of the stored version of x, xq) to affect design outputs will not be detected
using the equivalence checking version of our detection strategy.
The fact that combinational equivalence checking cannot be used to verify sequential
circuit behavior is well known, and techniques such as bounded sequential equivalence
checking and bounded model checking exist to address this limitation. These techniques
use time-frame expansion to capture k cycles of sequential behavior in a purely com-
binational circuit by copying the combinational circuit k times and connecting pseudo-
primary outputs in one time-frame to pseudo-primary inputs in the following time-frame
(ex. [93]).
If the sequential depth, k, of x is known, the method proposed in Section 5.5.3 can
analyze a version of the design expanded k time-frames to detect Trojans such as the
ones inserted in the UART design. The version of our detection strategy based on SMT
solving does not suffer from the same problem because a latch output variable, xq will
always have the corresponding latch input variable, x, in its data-flow graph, meaning
any formula for a primary output containing xq will also contain x.
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5.7 Summary
In this chapter we propose a detection methodology for Trojans in unspecified func-
tionality by formulating detection as a satisfiability problem based on the assumption
that unspecified functionality should not influence design outputs. Our detection proce-
dure can be followed using a wide variety of tools and techniques, and we give specifics
for Trojan detection using 1) SMT solving and 2) equivalence checking, meaning our
method is applicable to both RT and gate-level designs. We apply our detection method-
ology to an adder coprocessor and UART communication controller and successfully and
efficiently detect Trojan-infested versions of both designs. The inserted Trojans process
information leaked through the bus interface, exploiting the fact that bus protocols only
partially specify signal behavior. Our methodology is the first to provide a detection
mechanism for this Trojan type.
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Trojan Detection Using Exhaustive
Testing of k-bit Subspaces
6.1 Introduction
This chapter presents a post-silicon Trojan detection methodology which generates
test vectors targeting Trojans with rare triggering conditions. Our method overcomes
the shortcomings of existing post-silicon detection methodologies, which focus on con-
trollability and observability metrics meaning they cannot be applied to cryptographic
hardware where all plaintext bits have equal controllability.
Existing techniques used to detect hardware Trojans in a large chip population fall
into two main categories:
1. Techniques identifying anomalies in chip side-channel characteristics such as power
consumption and delay
2. Techniques identifying Trojans in the functional domain by improving circuit ob-
servability and activation likelihood
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Techniques which identify chips containing Trojans by comparing side-channel char-
acteristics such as power [94, 17] and delay [95] with Trojan-free chips or models derived
from the Trojan-free netlist, unlike functional testing, have the ability to identify ma-
licious behavior which does not affect any values of known circuit nodes. However,
side-channel detection methods face ever-increasing process variation, which can over-
shadow the influence a Trojan has on the chip signature, especially for large complex
designs such as SoCs. Beyond this, these focus mainly on the detection mechanism, and
still rely on the ability of the test vectors or placement of scan flip-flops to partially or
fully activate the Trojan. Determining which design states should be explored during
testing to activate Trojan circuitry, and how to best propagate Trojan behavior to ob-
servable points is an important task, on which the effectiveness of both side-channel and
functional detection methods rely on.
This chapter presents a post-silicon test vector generation strategy, especially appli-
cable to cryptographic hardware, that detects Trojans with triggers based on patterns
and sequences of digital signals. A stealthy Trojan has a very small probability of being
activated during both the verification effort and during normal operation, but is relatively
easy for the adversary to force.
Many existing methods for post-silicon test vector generation use node controllability
and observability to bias the test set [96, 97, 98, 99]. The assumption is that in order to
decrease Trojan activation probability, the adversary will select signals that have very low
0 or 1-controllability, making the combination of these rare values unlikely to occur during
testing. These strategies first identify random-pattern resistant nodes in the circuit, and
their corresponding rare values, then derive an optimal test set to trigger low probability
node values multiple (N) times. The usability of a Trojan from the attacker’s point of
view is severely diminished if the attacker cannot reliably control the triggering signals.
Existing methods assume all inputs are attacker controllable, hence every single node is
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Figure 6.1: AES Fault Attack Trojan
a candidate triggering signal for an attacker with complete knowledge of the design.
In cryptographic hardware, the key bits are unknown to the attacker, therefore any
internal circuit nodes influenced by key bits will be uncontrollable, hence cannot be
reliably used as triggering signals. For example, in AES, the first step is to XOR the
plaintext with key bits [100], leaving the plaintext bits as the only viable triggering
signals. For many Trojans proposed for AES [15, 16] and RSA [17], this is indeed the case,
and testing strategies based on rare circuit values are not applicable since all plaintext
bits have identical controllability and observability.
Challenge-response protocols implemented on both servers and embedded systems
such as smart cards, allow the challenger to select the plaintext. In the case of AES,
this gives the attacker 128 bits to choose from. Figure 6.1 illustrates the AES Trojan
implemented in [15] and [16]. Both works use a subset, k, of n bits (where n = 128), and
108
Trojan Detection Using Exhaustive Testing of k-bit Subspaces Chapter 6
the Trojan payload implements Piret’s differential fault attack [101], allowing recovery
of all secret key bits after observing as few as 2 faulty ciphertexts. Even if the attacker
utilizes only a small subset of the 128-bit plaintext, unless the verification team can
discover which subset the attacker will use, they are left facing the impossible task of
verifying all 2128 plaintext values.
Since exhaustive testing is infeasible, our solution makes the following observation:
An attacker can realistically only afford to use a small subset, k, of all n
possible controllable signals for triggering. Our Trojan detection strategy uses this
observation, instead of controllability and observability metrics, to reduce the state space
targeted by the test vectors. To our knowledge, we are the first to address scenarios where
controllability and observability metrics do not provide a foothold for biasing testing. Our
approach is exhaustive, but with respect to k instead of n, meaning that our test vectors
are guaranteed to activate a Trojan if the k-value chosen is realistic.
Section 6.4.2 discusses the factors involved in determining k, but intuitively a hard-
ware Trojan containing a 128-bit comparator or large counter will have a noticeable area
and power footprint. The feasibility of inserting such circuits is far less during fabri-
cation, but Trojans inserted pre-silicon have the opportunity to be detected by formal
methods, simulation, and analysis of the RTL code. This chapter also provides addi-
tional strategies for the case where one cannot afford exhaustive testing with respect to
the estimated k-value.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 6.2 specifies the class of Trojans
our solution detects and relates their activation to the concept of k-subspace coverage,
Section 6.3 details how to generate test vectors providing exhaustive k-subspace coverage,
Section 6.4 presents a case study where different Trojan triggers are inserted in a 128-bit
AES circuit and we discuss how area overhead metrics can influence the selection of k,
and Section 6.5 summarizes our contributions.
109
Trojan Detection Using Exhaustive Testing of k-bit Subspaces Chapter 6
6.2 Problem Definition and Formulation
6.2.1 Interaction with Existing Test and Detection Methods
Traditional manufacturing tests target stuck-at or delay fault models, based on circuit
structure. Trojans inserted during or after fabrication are not present in the gate-level
model therefore are not targeted by test pattern generation tools or candidates for ob-
servation points.
Because of the confusion and diffusion properties of cryptographic algorithms, the dif-
ficultly in Trojan detection lies in triggering the Trojan, not propagating faulty behavior
cause by the Trojan to observable points. For example, a Trojan payload may shorten
the number of rounds in a cipher or create a fault during encryption. In both cases, the
resulting cipher text will differ from the Trojan free version, and is easily detectable.
Therefore, for the remainder of the paper we focus on test generation strategies for
trigger activation, and do not address the class of Trojans which leak circuit information
through side channels. However, our method can be used in conjunction with existing side
channel detection methodologies to magnify the difference between Trojan and Trojan-
free side channel fingerprints in the case where information leakage only occurs after a
triggering condition is met.
6.2.2 Trojan Trigger Models
Our work aims to detect Trojans whose digital triggers take as input k design signals,
where 0 < k ≤ n, and n is the total number of attacker controllable signals.
For the attacker, increasing k decreases the probability that the Trojan is triggered
during testing, however an increase in k leads to a larger Trojan area and power footprint,
making the circuitry more visible.
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Table 6.1: Activation Probabilities during a sequence of t n-bit uniform random test
vectors for each trigger model
Combinational Partial Ordering
1− (1− 1
2k
)t
1− (1− 1
2km
)( tm)
Contiguous Ordering
1− (1− 1
2km
)t−m+1
We consider 3 classes of k-bit triggers:
1. Combinational: activation occurs immediately upon recognition of a k-bit pattern
2. Partially Ordered Sequence: activation occurs upon recognition of a partially
ordered sequence of m k-bit patterns
3. Contiguously Ordered Sequence: activation occurs upon recognition of a con-
tiguous sequence of m k-bit patterns
The Trojan activation probabilities during a sequence of t n-bit uniform random test
vectors for trigger classes 1 - 3 are given by the equations in Table 6.1. Depending on
the desired Trojan area overhead and activation probability, the attacker can implement
any of the 3 trigger types inside the Triggering Logic block in Figure 6.1.
It should be noted that for the partial and contiguous orderings, the m patterns need
not be unique. However, implementing even a few different k-bit pattern recognizers leads
to an significant increase in Trojan area, as seen in Table 6.7 in Section 6.4.1, without
decreasing activation probability. Therefore, it is very reasonable to assume that only 1
k-bit pattern is used in conjunction with a counter.
Counting m patterns before triggering greatly reduces activation probability. A spe-
cial case of trigger classes 2 and 3 is a large counter that counts clock cycles instead of
patterns. [14] refers to this type of trigger as a “time bomb”, and proposes periodically
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Figure 6.2: All 6 2-bit Subspaces in a 4-bit Vector
performing power resets during circuit operation to limit the maximum counter value,
forcing the attacker to use a smaller counter if the Trojan is ever to trigger in the field.
If circuit validation is run for a time period exceeding the power reset period, the Trojan
is guaranteed to be triggered. For the more general class of sequential triggers that we
are considering, power resets effectively limit the value of m, but the test vectors must
still ensure the appearance of the magic k-bit pattern m times before activation.
6.2.3 Subspace Coverage
Let n be the number of possible attacker-influenced circuit nodes. Some examples
are the plaintext bits in cryptographic hardware or bus data bits on a processor running
untrusted software or firmware. If a Trojan can incorporate a maximum of k bits into
its triggering mechanism, the goal of the detection effort is to apply the smallest number
of n-bit test vectors, |Tmin(n, k)|, which exhaustively cover all 2k possible values that
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can occur on all
(
n
k
)
possible sets of k-bit signals (k-subspaces), guaranteeing Trojan
activation.
Figure 6.2 shows all 6 possible 2-subspaces when n = 4. One simple method of
generating the test vectors for this set is to target each subspace individually, result-
ing in
(
n
k
) × 2k = (4
2
) × 22 = 24 test vectors. However, since only 16 test vectors are
needed to exhaustively test 4-bits, it is obvious that this method does not generate
Tmin(n, k). An example exhaustive 2-subspace test set generated by trial and error con-
tains only 5 vectors: {0000, 0111, 1110, 1101, 1011}. These 5 vectors guarantee activation
of a trigger using any 2 out of 4 controllable bits matching any 2-bit pattern. Clearly,
2k ≤ |Tmin(n, k)| ≤ 2n, but it is not obvious how to generate Tmin(n, k) systematically,
or determine |Tmin(n, k)|.
6.3 Our Solution
6.3.1 Test Generation for Exhaustive k-subspace Coverage
A method for generating several sets of n-bit test vectors which exhaustively cover
all k-subspaces is given in [102]. Each test set is composed of 1 or more sets of constant
weight vectors. A set of constant weight vectors is the set of all n-bit vectors with a given
Hamming weight w. There are
(
n
w
)
vectors in a constant weight set.
There are n−k+1 test sets to choose from, and each is described by a set of weights,
which are found by solving Equation 6.1 with n− k + 1 different values for c.
w ≡ c mod (n− k + 1), 0 ≤ c ≤ n− k (6.1)
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Table 6.2: Test Sets for n = 8, k = 3
c Weight Set Test Length, |T (8, 3)|
0 {0, 6} 29
1 {1, 7} 16
2 {2, 8} 29
3 {3} 56
4 {4} 70
5 {5} 56
The number of test vectors in each test set is
∑
all weights
(
n
wi
)
(6.2)
For example, let n = 8 and k = 3. Equation 6.1 becomes
w ≡ c mod (6), 0 ≤ c ≤ 5 (6.3)
There are 6 different test sets which can exhaustively cover all 3-subspaces. The
weights and test lengths are given in Table 6.2. Clearly, not all generated test sets are
optimal. The test set composed of all vectors with Hamming weights 1 and 7 is the
smallest. The weights for the smallest test set are given by Equation 6.4. The size of the
minimal test set, |Tmin(n, k)|, is given by Equation 6.5 [102].
w0 =
⌊
k
2
⌋
, w1 =
⌊
k
2
⌋
+ (n− k + 1) (6.4)
|Tmin(n, k)| =
(
n⌊
k
2
⌋)+ ( n
k − ⌊k
2
⌋− 1
)
(6.5)
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Table 6.3: Test Set Length for Exhaustive k-subspace Coverage
n m k Test Set Length
128 1 2 27
128 1 4 213
128 1 8 223
128 1 16 240
128 1 32 267
128 4 8 225
128 8 8 226
128 10000 8 237
256 1 8 227
256 10000 8 241
2048 1 8 239
2048 10000 8 253
6.3.2 Sequential Triggers
If the Trojan is triggered by partially or continuously ordered sequences of m k-bit
patterns, the minimal k-subspace exhaustive test set, Tmin(n, k), provided in the previous
section does not guarantee activation.
Partial Ordering: All partially ordered sequences of m k-bit patterns can be ex-
haustively tested using |Tmin(n, k)| ×m vectors by repeating Tmin(n, k) m times.
Contiguous Ordering: If the m patterns can be distinct, then |Tmin(n, k)|m test
vectors are needed to exhaustively cover this scenario! If the same k-bit pattern, occurring
m times in a row, triggers the Trojan, we can repeat each vector in Tmin(n, k) m times
to exhaustively cover this case using only |Tmin(n, k)| ×m test vectors.
6.3.3 Example Test Set Sizes
Table 6.3 illustrates how n, m, and k affect the test set size for exhaustive k-subspace
testing. For Trojans with m > 1, Table 6.3 shows the test length assuming either partial
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ordering of m possibly distinct patterns, or contiguous ordering of m identical patterns.
Increasing k and n results in exponential growth in test size. Increasing m causes linear
growth in test size, and can be limited by using the power reset technique [14].
6.3.4 When Exhaustive k-subspace Testing is Too Expensive
Although exhaustive k-subspace coverage requires fewer than 2n vectors, test size
grows exponentially with increases in n and k, as seen in Table 6.3, in some cases making
exhaustive testing infeasible. Let kmax be the maximum number of bits a Trojan trigger
can utilize, and Tmax be the number of vectors budgeted for testing. When |T (n, kmax)| ≤
Tmax, the exhaustive kmax-subspace test set is both guaranteed to activate the Trojan
and within Tmax. However, when |T (n, kmax)| > Tmax, other testing strategies must be
considered.
Since our method aims to detect Trojans in designs where signal controllability and
observability cannot guide test vector selection, the only alternative testing strategy is
the application of uniform random vectors to the attacker controllable bits in the design.
Depending on Tmax, n, k, and kmax, one can consider the following test sets:
• Strategy 1: Tmax uniform random vectors
• Strategy 2: The complete exhaustive k-subspace test set where k < kmax, and
|T (n, k)| ≤ Tmax
• Strategy 3: The complete exhaustive k-subspace test set where |T (n, k)| ≈ Tmax
2
in addition to Tmax
2
random vectors (excluding those already in T (n, k))
The Trojan activation probability, pa, for Strategy 1 is given in Table 6.1, pa for
Strategy 3 is computed using simulation, while the derivation of pa for Strategy 2 is
given below.
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Strategy 2 pa: The probability of observing a random kmax-bit pattern in the k-
subspace exhaustive test set T (n, k), where k < kmax, can be derived by considering the
possible Hamming weights, wtroj, for the kmax-bit triggering pattern, where 0 ≤ wtroj ≤
kmax. T (n, k) contains all possible n-bit vectors with Hamming weights {w0, w1} given
by Equation 6.1. T (n, k) is guaranteed to activate a Trojan with weight wtroj if the
kfree = n − kmax bits unused by the Trojan can be assigned a Hamming weight x such
that Equation 6.6 holds.
wtroj + x = w0 or w1 (6.6)
f(T,wtroj, kmax) =
 0 6 ∃ a solution to Eq. 6.61 ∃ a solution to Eq. 6.6 (6.7)
By enumerating all trigger pattern Hamming weights and considering how many such
patterns exist for a given n, the number of patterns detectable by any given T (n, k) can
be computed, leading to the formula for activation probability given in Equation 6.8.
pa =
∑kmax
wtroj=0
(
kmax
wtroj
)× f(T,wtroj, kmax)
2kmax
(6.8)
Comparisons and Discussion: Table 6.4 compares the activation probability
given for Strategy 2 with the activation probability for Tmax uniform random vectors
when n = 128. Table 6.5 shows how the mixed test set (Strategy 3), compares with
the uniform random vectors for n = 128 and various values of k and kmax. |T (n, k)| is
the number of test vectors in the exhaustive k-subspace test set, |Trnd| is the number of
weighted random vectors used, and |Ttotal| = |T (n, k)|+ |Trnd|.
Exhaustive k-subspace test sets always have lower activation probabilities than the
same number of uniform random vectors when kmax > k. This is because uniform random
vectors sample from the entire space of 2n possible vectors while T (n, k) is restricted to
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Table 6.4: Strategy 2 v. Strategy 1 – Activation Probabilities for n = 128
kmax k |T (n, k)| pa (T (n, k)) pa (rand)
16 4 213 0.00235 0.1184
16 8 223 0.04904 0.9999
32 4 213 1.309e-07 1.922e-06
32 8 223 1.093e-05 0.00256
32 16 240 0.004551 0.9999
64 4 213 1.163e-16 4.476e-16
64 8 223 3.919e-14 5.968e-13
64 16 240 3.163e-10 8.263e-08
Table 6.5: Strategy 3 v. Strategy 1 – Activation Probabilities for n = 128
kmax k |T (n, k)|, |Trnd|, pa pa
|Ttotal| (mixed) (rand)
8 3 256, 256, 512 0.6574 0.8652
16 3 256, 256, 512 0.0036 0.007782
20 3 256, 256, 512 0.0003 0.0004882
10 5 214, 214, 215 0.9999 0.9999
16 5 214, 214, 215 0.213 0.3911
20 5 214, 214, 215 0.017 0.03053
vectors of particular Hamming weights. As kmax becomes larger compared to k, there
are more Trojan trigger Hamming weights not targeted by exhaustive k-subspace vectors
that uniform random vectors still sample from.
The advantage of using exhaustive k-subspace test vectors for a feasible k is that
activation for all subspaces smaller than k is guaranteed. Because hardware
Trojan insertion is challenging, especially during fabrication, k values smaller than kmax
are more likely. If random vectors can be used in combination (Strategy 3) to target
the less likely larger k values, the activation probability is closer to that of the uniform
random vectors. Strategy 3 provides a balance between guaranteed activation for smaller
k and optimal sampling of the remaining state space with random vectors.
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Table 6.6: % Area Increase and G: Gate Count (Equivalent 2-input NAND Gates) v.
k and m (identical patterns) for n = 128
m
1 128 1024 8192
k % G % G % G % G
4 0.11 25 0.77 176 1.00 230 1.23 282
8 0.14 32 0.83 190 1.06 243 1.29 295
32 0.32 72 1.18 270 1.41 323 1.64 376
64 0.55 125 1.65 377 1.88 430 2.11 482
128 1.01 232 2.58 590 2.82 644 3.04 695
6.4 AES Trojan Case Study
6.4.1 Area Overhead
We have implemented the Trojan in Figure 6.1 for each of the 3 Trojan trigger types
shown in Section 6.2.2 in an AES encryption IP from OpenCores [103], where n = 128.
The infected designs were synthesized in 45nm technology using the NanGate Open
Cell Library [92] with Synopsys Design Compiler (ver I-2013.12-SP2) and routed using
Cadence Encounter (v09.14) to quantify the overhead due to the trojan logic. The
percentage increase in area for the infected design and equivalent 2-input NAND gate
count of the Trojan is shown in Table 6.6 for various m and k values.
In Table 6.6, the m patterns are identical, not distinct. It can be seen in Table 6.7
that if the trigger is designed with multiple distinct patterns, the area overhead increases
significantly. For example, when k = 4 and the number of distinct patterns is 4, the area
overhead is already greater than 1% of the original design. The synthesis area and NAND
gate-count increase significantly as k and m increase, more sharply with an increase in
k than that of m. This is because the value of m doubles with addition of only a single
counter bit, while increasing k requires an increase in the comparison logic of the trigger.
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Table 6.7: % Area Increase and G: Gate Count (Equivalent 2-input NAND Gates) v.
k and # of Distinct Patterns for n = 128 and m = 8192
# distinct patterns
4 8 16
k % G % G % G
4 1.36 310 1.82 417 2.72 621
8 1.48 338 2.05 470 3.18 728
32 2.17 497 3.46 790 5.98 1368
A limit on m can be enforced by using the power reset strategy outlined in [14].
6.4.2 Factors Influencing kmax
Determining the feasibility of different kmax values requires formulating a realistic
threat model for each design and testing scenario. Our method can target Trojans in-
serted both pre-silicon and during fabrication, but the ease of Trojan insertion and the
variety of detection methodologies available at both stages differs greatly.
Trojan Insertion Pre-silicon: On one hand, Trojans inserted in 3rd party IP
have practically no limits on Trojan size, since the customer often only has access to
the net list or a pre-routed block, making it difficult to reverse engineer the design and
identify Trojans or detect increases in area due to Trojan circuitry. Also, post-silicon
side-channel detection methods will fail due to the lack of Trojan-free gate-level models,
as well as the lack of golden reference chips.
On the other hand, complete observability during simulation and the availability of
formal methods such as equivalence checking provide powerful opportunities for detec-
tion strategies such as [104]. If a Trojan is inserted at gate-level (post-synthesis), and
attempts to hide within minor changes made during the effort to meet timing and power
requirements, the presence of several hundred extra gates will surely be noticed, as is
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the case for when k > 32, and m > 128 as seen in Table 6.6. How reverse engineering,
code and circuit analysis, and formal methods can be used to either prove kmax = 0
or determine a reasonable kmax to target using our post-silicon exhaustive k-subspace
approach is a topic for further research.
Trojan Insertion During Fabrication: Modifying the optical mask to insert
Trojans is extremely difficult. Only a few works have actually fabricated circuits con-
taining hardware Trojans and analyzed the complexity of insertion at mask level. In [16],
Trojans instrumenting Piret’s fault attack on an AES circuit are inserted into the layout
using a commercial Engineering Change Order (ECO) placement tool. They vary the
number of plaintext bits used in the trigger until the software is no longer able to place
the ECO without completely re-routing the entire design.
With a Core Utilization Rate of 99%, the tool cannot place an ECO for a Trojan
composed of as few as 16 AND gates. While further research is required to validate this
approach for estimating an upper bound on kmax, it is clear that k is severely restricted
for mask level Trojan insertion, making exhaustive k-subspace testing a feasible and
complete method for guaranteeing Trojan activation.
6.5 Summary
Our AES circuit case study shows that realistically, an attacker can only incorporate
k out of all n possible controllable signals into a Trojan triggering mechanism, where
k << n. In this chapter we use this observation instead of the controllability and
observability metrics widely employed in existing methods to guarantee detection of
Trojans in cryptographic circuits using up to k triggering signals [28]. We also present
additional strategies when the size of k requires a prohibitively large exhaustive test set
to guarantee detection.
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Conclusions
In this document we have addressed the threat of Hardware Trojans in unspecified design
functionality. Due to the complexity of modern chips, a design specification usually
only defines a small fraction of behavior. Traditional verification techniques only focus
on ensuring the correctness of specified behavior, meaning any modifications or bugs
(malicious or accidental) only affecting unspecified functionality will likely go undetected.
Several chapters of this dissertation are dedicated to illustrating how this verification
hole allows an attacker with the ability to modify the design to stealthily undermine the
security of a system. We have shown that all secret key bits in an Elliptic Curve Processor
can be leaked by only modifying RTL don’t cares, and that it is possible to create a covert
Trojan communication channel on top of existing on-chip bus infrastructure for several
common bus protocols by only modifying the on-chip bus interface signals when the
channel is idle. This channel is shown to allow an attacker running as an unprivileged
software program access to root-user data.
By viewing security as an extension of the verification problem we develop several
analysis methodologies based on existing techniques such as equivalence checking and
mutation testing which both detect Trojans and increase confidence in the correctness of
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specified design functionality. These techniques include a Trojan prevention methodology
based on equivalence checking that classifies all don’t care bits in a design as dangerous
or safe, a mutation testing based methodology capable of identifying dangerous unspec-
ified functionality regardless of the abstraction level or class of design analyzed, and a
methodology which inspects this dangerous unspecified functionality for the existence of
Trojans by formulating Trojan detection in terms of satisfiability. Once Trojan detec-
tion is expressed as a satisfiability problem, there is a wide variety of existing tools and
techniques which can be employed to detect Trojans. In this document we detail Tro-
jan detection using SMT solvers and data-flow graph analysis for RT-level designs, and
combinational equivalence checking for gate-level designs. We also present a post-silicon
Trojan detection methodology for Trojans with rare triggering conditions.
Because unspecified functionality is by nature unknown, there is still much work to
be done in fully exploring the scope of the Trojan threat in this space. Future work
includes exploration of unspecified functionality at higher levels of abstraction such as
TLM and SystemC, and analyzing how unused instruction fields (common in almost every
instruction set architecture) can be used to encode Trojan operations. The Trojan threat
at the hardware/software boundary is another direction for future work as device driver
and operating system code interacts closely with hardware, and many of the techniques
developed in this thesis may be applicable to detecting software Trojans.
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